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ABSTRACT

Patent eligibility is one of the most important and controversial
issues in intellectual property law. Although the relevant constitutional
and statutory text is extremely broad, the Supreme Court has significantly
narrowed the scope of patentable eligibility by creating exceptions for
inventions directed to abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural
phenomenon. In particular, the Supreme Court’s decisions on this issue
over the past decade have created considerable uncertainty regarding the
patentability of important innovations. As a result, numerous stakeholders
have called for reform of the current rules regarding patent eligibility,
and members of Congress have introduced legislation to amend the Patent
Act to provide greater clarity.
The current quandary regarding patent eligibility is nothing new,
however. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court was similarly
challenged by inventors’ attempts to obtain patent rights to a number of
then-emerging technologies, including computer software and
genetically-modified organisms. After initially concluding that processes
consisting of or including an algorithm were not patentable subject matter
in Gottschalk v. Benson (1972) and Parker v. Flook (1978), the Court
abruptly changed course in Diamond v. Diehr (1981), holding that the use
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of a computer program to implement a method for curing synthetic rubber
was eligible for patenting. Similarly, in the life sciences, the Court
overturned a USPTO decision rejecting a patent on a geneticallymodified bacteria, concluding in Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) that a
non-naturally occurring organism was patent eligible. These decisions
ultimately opened the door to thousands of patents covering computer
software and biotechnology innovations. Moreover, they remain good law
and are widely cited, including by the Court itself.
To better understand these older patent eligibility decisions, this
Article examines archival material from the chambers of Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., who was one of the “swing” votes on the Burger Court. Using
this previously-untapped resource, we report several notable findings,
including that the Court initially voted to find the process in Flook to be
patent eligible, only for two Justices to subsequently switch their votes. In
addition, Justice Powell privately expressed the view that his vote in Flook
was in error, ultimately changing sides in Diehr to adopt a more
expansive view of patent eligibility. We also find evidence that the Justices
and their clerks often struggled with the technological complexity of these
new innovations in assessing their patentability, frequently commenting
that Congress was better body for addressing such issues. We then offer
several implications from these findings for the ongoing debate regarding
the scope of patent eligibility.

I. INTRODUCTION
Patent eligibility1—what types of innovations can be patented—is
one of the most significant and controversial issues in intellectual property
law. 2 In the past decade, the Supreme Court has struck down patents and

1. This Article uses the phrases “patent eligible,” “patent eligibility,” and “patentable subject
matter” interchangeably to refer to inventions that are eligible for patent protection under U.S. patent
law. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014) (“The question presented is whether
these claims are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588
(1978) (“This case turns entirely on the proper construction of § 101 of the Patent Act, which
describes the subject matter that is eligible for patent protection.”).
2. See John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for
Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1765 (2014)
(“Defining the bounds of patentable subject matter has become one of patent law’s hottest issues.”);
Jake M. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2014)
(“Recently, patents on human genes, software, and business methods have stoked a heated public
discussion . . . . Much of that discussion has focused on the doctrine of patent eligibility, or patentable
subject matter, a century-and-a-half old legal doctrine that limits the types of inventions that can be
patented.”).
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patent applications for abstract ideas, 3 medical diagnostic tests, 4 genetic
information in naturally-occurring DNA sequences, 5 and computerimplemented methods for facilitating financial transactions.6 Following
these precedents, lower federal courts have invalidated patents covering
cybersecurity software, 7 search engine optimization, 8 voter verification
systems, 9 and fetal DNA testing for genetic abnormalities. 10 And
thousands of patent claims have been rejected at the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) and invalidated in litigation for lack of
patentable subject matter. 11 As a result, patent eligibility remains unclear
for a number of cutting-edge fields of technology, including artificial
intelligence, 12 blockchain technology, 13 quantum computing, 14 and
personalized medicine. 15

3. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 595 (2010).
4. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012).
5. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 576 (2013).
6. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014).
7. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 13-CV-3777(AKH),
2015 WL 1941331, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2015); Glasswall Sols. Ltd. v. Clearswift Ltd., No. C161833 RAJ, 2017 WL 5882415, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 29, 2017), aff’d, 754 Fed. App’x 996 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
8. See, e.g., BrightEdge Techs., Inc., v. Searchmetrics, GmbH, 304 F. Supp. 3d 859, 861
(N.D. Cal. 2018).
9. See, e.g., Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. & Software LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
10. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
11. See Robert Sachs, Alice: Benevolent Despot or Tyrant? Analyzing Five Years of Case Law
(Aug.
29,
2019),
Since
Alice
v.
CLS
Bank:
Part
I,
IPWATCHDOG
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/08/29/alice-benevolent-despot-or-tyrant-analyzing-five-yearsof-case-law-since-alice-v-cls-bank-part-i/id=112722 [https://perma.cc/Z9R8-KVPK] (“Over 1,000
patents have been invalidated by federal courts and the . . . Patent Trial and Appeal Board . . . .”).
12. See generally Mizuki Hashiguchi, The Global Artificial Intelligence Revolution Challenges
Patent Eligibility Laws, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1 (2017).
13. See generally Gurneet Singh, Are Internet-Implemented Applications of Block-Chain
Technology Patent-Eligible in the United States?, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. L. 356 (2018);
Antonio M. DiNizo Jr., Note, From Alice to Bob: The Patent Eligibility of Blockchain in a Post-CLS
Bank World, 9 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1 (2018).
14. See Matthew Fagan, Quantum Computing Raises Problems For The Patent System,
IPLAW360 (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1077025/quantum-computing-raisesproblems-for-the-patent-system [https://perma.cc/RQP7-MVJT].
15. See Rebecca Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 256
(2015); Christopher M. Holman, Mayo, Myriad, and the Future of Innovation in Molecular
Diagnostics and Personalized Medicine, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 639, 639 (2014); Rachel E. Sachs,
Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1881, 1881 (2016).
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In the wake of these developments, federal judges, 16 patent attorneys
and owners, 17 leading academics, 18 and current and former Directors of
the USPTO 19 have called for significant changes to the law governing
patent eligibility. In response, Congress held hearings in 2019 to consider
amending § 101 to bring greater clarity and certainty to the scope of
patentable subject matter and its judicially created exceptions.20
Notably, this is not the first time the Supreme Court has attempted to
address questions of patent eligibility in the face of new technologies. In
the 1970s and early 1980s, the Burger Court sought to resolve whether
inventions involving computer software could be patented. Initially, the
16. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Lourie & Newman, JJ.,
concurring in denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (“I believe the law [regarding patent eligibility]
needs clarification by higher authority, perhaps by Congress, to work its way out of what so many in
the innovation field consider are § 101 problems.”); Brief of the Honorable Paul R. Michel (Ret.) as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC
(No. 19-430) (Nov. 1, 2019) (calling for Supreme Court intervention to address existing doctrinal
confusion regarding § 101).
17. See Joint IPO-AIPLA Proposal on Patent Eligibility, AIPLA (May 2018),
https://www.aipla.org/advocacy/legislative/joint-aipla-ipo-proposal-on-patent-eligibility
[https://perma.cc/EU88-H7CP]; see also AIPLA Legislative Proposal and Report on Patent Eligible
Subject
Matter,
AIPLA
(May
12,
2017),
https://www.aipla.org/docs/defaultsource/uploadedfiles/documents/resources2/reports/2017aipladirect/documents/aipla-report-on-101reform-5-19-17-errata.pdf?sfvrsn=138c9ce7_1 [https://perma.cc/XG3M-UG9S].
18. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin et al., Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law &
Technology Section 101 Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 33 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 551, 592–600 (2018); David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149
(2017); Kristen Osenga, Institutional Design for Innovation: A Radical Proposal for Addressing § 101
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1191 (2019); The State of Patent Eligibility in
America: Part I: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
116th Cong. (June 4, 2019) (statement of Professor Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia
Law
School
George
Mason
University),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mossoff%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y79U-KV5V].
19. Ryan Davis, Kappos Calls For Abolition Of Section 101 Of Patent Act, LAW360 (Apr. 12,
2016),
https://www.law360.com/articles/783604/kappos-calls-for-abolition-of-section-101-ofpatent-act [https://perma.cc/64PJ-GTQL]; Andrei S. Iancu, Remarks by Director Iancu at the 10th
Annual Patent Law & Policy Conference, USPTO (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/aboutus/news-updates/remarks-director-iancu-10th-annual-patent-law-policy-conference
[https://perma.cc/MA3J-KMLS].
20. See The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part I, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop., S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 4, 2019),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-i
[https://perma.cc/SJB2-QH4D]; The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part II, Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 5, 2019),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-ii
[https://perma.cc/ND7A-8RVC]; The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part III, Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 11, 2019),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-state-of-patent-eligibility-in-america-part-iii
[https://perma.cc/M9DB-YRYE].
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Court concluded in Gottschalk v. Benson (1972) 21 and Parker v. Flook
(1978) 22 that processes where the claim’s novelty relies upon an algorithm
were not patent eligible unless the claim also amounted to an “inventive
application” of that algorithm. 23 Just three years later, however, the Court
abruptly reversed course, concluding in Diamond v. Diehr (1981), 24
which involved a superficially similar set of facts to Flook, that an
industrial process incorporating a mathematical algorithm was indeed
patentable subject matter. 25 And in an often-overlooked companion case
to Diehr decided the same month, Diamond v. Bradley (1981), an equallydivided Court affirmed a lower court’s decision that an invention for more
efficiently storing information in a general-purpose computer was patent
eligible, overturning the patent office’s rejection of the claimed invention
in light of Benson and Flook. 26
The Burger Court also considered the patent eligibility of
genetically-modified organisms (GMOs). 27 At the time, living organisms
were widely viewed as unpatentable subject matter. 28 But in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty (1980), the Court held 5–4 that a living, geneticallymodified Pseudonomas bacteria was patent eligible as either a
“manufacture” or “composition of matter” under § 101. 29 This decision is

21. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972).
22. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1978).
23. See id. at 591 (“The process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be new
and useful. Indeed, the novelty of the mathematical algorithm is not a determining factor at all. . . .
[T]he algorithm . . . is treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.”).
24. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185–93 (1980).
25. See Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1087, 1096 (2007) (“Although the invention in Diehr looks, at least superficially, similar to Flook—
data are measured, data are manipulated using a mathematical algorithm or formula, and the output
of the algorithm is used from some industrial purpose—the outcome of the case was diametrically
opposite.”); see also Diamond, 450 U.S. at 209 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “th[e] method of
updating the curing time calculation” at issue in Diehr “is strikingly reminiscent of the method of
updating alarm limits that . . . Flook sought to patent.”).
26. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 808 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff’d by an equally-divided court, 450
U.S. 381, 381 (1981) (per curiam). Chief Justice Burger, who voted with the majority in Diehr,
recused himself in Bradley.
27. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
28. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 187 (1987) (“[P]rior to the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, patent protection for biological materials was retarded by the longstanding belief that
living organisms and cells were unpatentable products of nature.”). The then-leading Supreme Court
case, Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), held that a combination of
naturally-occurring bacteria that were not mutually inhibiting in enabling nitrogen fixation in plants
was a “product of nature” that was unpatentable subject matter.
29. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 312–18.
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widely viewed as opening the door to the patenting of GMOs, which
helped usher in the biotechnology revolution. 30
Even though these decisions are now several decades old, they
remain central to the issue of patent eligibility. As one study recently
noted, the Burger Court’s patent-eligibility jurisprudence “form[s] the
backbone of the current § 101 analysis.” 31 Indeed, the Court has taken
pains in its more recent patent eligibility decisions to reconcile its
holdings with these precedents, with varying degrees of success. In Bilski
v. Kappos (2010), Justice Kennedy devoted an entire section of his
opinion for the Court summarizing Benson, Flook, and Diehr, and then
contended that, “in light of these precedents,” Bilski’s attempt to claim
the concept of hedging amounted to “an unpatentable abstract idea, just
like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook.” 32 Similarly, Justice
Breyer’s opinion in Mayo v. Prometheus (2012) seemingly resurrected
Flook’s “inventive concept” approach to patent eligibility, holding that
the claimed method of determining the level of thiopurine drugs in a
patient’s bloodstream was unpatentable because it amounted to little more
than a claim over a law of nature that lacked a patent-eligible
application. 33
To better understand the Court’s reasoning in these older patent
eligibility cases, we examined archival material from the chambers of
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who was one of the “swing” votes on the
Burger Court. 34 Justice Powell was a meticulous record keeper during his
time on the Court, and his files for these cases contain a wealth of material,
including bench memoranda from law clerks at the cert petition and merits
stages, handwritten notes from oral argument and the Justices’
conferences, and drafts of opinions and memoranda from the other

30. See Douglas Robinson & Nina Medlock, Diamond v. Chakrabarty: A Retrospective on 25
Years of Biotech Patents, 17 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 12, 12 (2005) (“Chakrabarty has affected
the lives of virtually everyone in the United States, having contributed to a revolution in
biotechnology that has resulted in the issuance of thousands of patents, the formation of hundreds of
new companies, and the development of thousands of bioengineered plants and food products.”).
31. Jeremy D. Roux, Note, The Supreme Court and § 101 Jurisprudence: Reconciling SubjectMatter Patentability Standards and the Abstract Idea Exception, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 636–37
(2014).
32. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609–13 (2010). Justice Kennedy also referred to Benson,
Flook, and Diehr as “guideposts” for determining “what constitutes a patentable ‘process.’” Id. at
612.
33. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012) (citing Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)); see also Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67
FLA. L. REV. 565, 641 (2015) (“Mayo’s ‘inventive concept’ came directly from Parker v. Flook.”).
34. See generally Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, WASHINGTON & LEE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW,
https://law.wlu.edu/powell-archives [https://perma.cc/W9GS-4JDM].
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Justices. 35 In sum, Justice Powell’s case files help provide an inside view
into the Burger Court’s decision-making process regarding patent
eligibility.
These archival materials reveal a number of previously unreported
details regarding the Court’s patentable subject matter decisions from the
1970s and early 1980s. First, the initial vote in Parker v. Flook—which
represents the Burger Court’s high water mark regarding the
unpatentability of processes involving algorithms—was tentatively 5–4 to
affirm the lower court, which found Flook’s process to be patent eligible.
However, in a memorandum circulated on the same day as the initial vote
in conference, Justice Harry Blackmun changed his vote from “tentatively
to affirm” to “tentatively to reverse.” Then, after draft opinions for the
majority and dissent had been circulated, Justice Byron White also
switched his vote from affirm to reverse. Thus, Flook appears to have been
a closer call than its final 6–3 vote suggests.
Second, Justice Powell later expressed the view that his decision in
Flook was wrong, at least insofar as that case conflated issues of novelty
and nonobviousness under §§ 102 and 103 with the patent eligibility
inquiry under § 101. In a remarkably candid handwritten note on a bench
memorandum in Diehr prepared by one of his law clerks, Justice Powell
stated that the memorandum was “[p]ersuasive that my vote in Flook was
[in] error.” 36 And according to his own notes from the post-argument
conference in Diehr, Justice Powell expressed his view to the other
Justices that “[d]espite Flook, novelty should be irrelevant under § 101.” 37
Ultimately, Justice Powell provided the key vote in Diehr, joining four
other Justices to find the invention to be patent eligible, even though, like
Flook, the claimed process included a specific algorithm.
Third, the archival materials reveal that the Justices and their law
clerks were fully aware of the importance of the issue of patent eligibility
and how it might shape the development of the nascent computer software
and biotechnology industries, but often felt out of their depth when it came
to understanding both the complexity of patent law and the intricacies of
the technical details in these cases. As a result, members of the Court,
including Justice Powell, repeatedly expressed the view both publicly and

35. For a description of the creation of the Powell Archive and nature of the written materials
housed there from Justice Powell’s time on the Supreme Court, see generally John N. Jacob, The
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives and the Contemporary Researcher, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (1992);
John N. Jacob, The Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives at Washington and Lee University School of Law,
17 TRENDS L. LIBR. MGMT. & TECH. 7 (2007).
36. See authorities cited infra note 320 and accompanying text.
37. See Diehr Case File, infra note 290, at 25.
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privately that Congress ultimately was better suited to determine the scope
of patent eligibility than the courts. This issue is mirrored in recent calls
for Congress to amend § 101 to resolve the ongoing uncertainty about the
scope of patent eligibility.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides
background regarding the historical development of patent eligibility in
the United States, including the relevant constitutional and statutory
provisions and key Supreme Court precedents prior to the Burger Court.
Part III contains an in-depth examination of the Burger Court’s patent
eligibility cases: Gottschalk v. Benson, Parker v. Flook, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, Diamond v. Diehr, and Diamond v. Bradley. Part IV
examines the continued development of patent eligibility jurisprudence
since these decisions, with a particular focus on how the current case law
regarding patent eligibility heavily relies on the Burger Court’s
precedents. Part V offers several implications from our findings,
particularly as they relate to the ongoing debate regarding proposed
reforms to the scope of patentable subject matter. Part VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
To set the stage for the remainder of the Article, this Part summarizes
the development of patent eligibility jurisprudence in the United States
prior to the Burger Court. It first describes the relevant constitutional and
statutory text and their history. It then recounts some prominent Supreme
Court decisions regarding the scope of and limits to patent eligibility prior
to Benson.
A.

The Constitution’s IP Clause

The text of the Intellectual Property (IP) Clause 38 of the Constitution
provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 39 As other intellectual property scholars have noted, the
language of this clause is unique in Article I because it not only grants
Congress express authority to legislate, but it also appears to constrain
how that authority can be exercised. 40 The Supreme Court has adopted a
38. This clause is sometimes also called the “Patent and Copyright Clause.”
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 8, § 8.
40. See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress
as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1774 (2006) (“[T]he
structure of the [Intellectual Property] Clause is unique . . . . Whereas the other enumerated powers
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similar understanding, noting the Clause “is both a grant of power and a
limitation” on Congress’s legislative power, and explaining that Congress
“may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional
purpose”—i.e., “the promotion of advances in the ‘useful arts.’” 41
Interestingly, during the Constitutional Convention, James Madison
initially proposed a version of the IP Clause that would have limited
patents to “useful machines and implements.” 42 A competing proposal by
James Pickney was broader in scope, authorizing Congress “[t]o grant
patents for useful inventions,” without any limitation as to the categories
of “inventions” eligible for patenting. 43 Both proposals were referred to a
committee, which recommended the language that presently appears in
the Constitution, and this language was unanimously adopted without any
recorded debate. 44
B.

Statutory Text and History

The current version of § 101 provides that an inventor may obtain a
patent for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 45
“[N]o patent is available for a discovery . . . unless it falls into one of
the[se] express categories of patentable subject matter . . . .” 46 These
categories are merely a starting point for the patentability analysis,
however. First, in a line of decisions dating back to the 19th century, the
Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to patent eligibility: “laws
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” 47 Second, the patent
applicant must also satisfy the other requirements of the Patent Act,

generally consist of ‘to’ (or ends) clauses that demarcate areas of legitimate federal regulation . . .
Congress’s intellectual property power contains, in addition to the ‘to’ clause, a ‘by’ (or means)
clause.”); Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the Intellectual
Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 90 (1999) (“The intellectual property clause is unique
among the constitutional powers granted to Congress in that it is the only one that sets forth a
particular and specific mode of exercising the power.”).
41. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6).
42. Oliar, supra note 40, at 1789.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1790.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). The idea of statutory classes of patentable subject matter can be
traced as far back in legal history as the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, which granted a 14year “privilege” for “new manufactures.” See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.01
(2019).
46. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974).
47. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309 (1980)).
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including novelty (§ 102), nonobviousness (§ 103) and adequate
disclosure of the invention (§ 112). 48
The statutory text regarding patentability has remained largely
unchanged since the 1793 Patent Act, which provided that “any new and
useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement [thereof],” was eligible for patent protection.49
The 1952 Patent Act substituted “process” for “art,” 50 and further defined
“process” as a “process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.” 51 The
legislative history suggests that this change was not intended to alter the
scope of patent eligibility. 52 P.J. Federico, one of the drafters of the 1952
Patent Act, explained that courts had used the word “art” as “practically
synonymous with process or method,” and the switch in terminology was
intended to avoid potential confusion. 53
The legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act also includes an oftquoted phrase regarding patent eligibility: “anything under the sun that is
made by man.” 54 This language was first cited by the Court of Claims and
Patent Appeals almost three decades later in an opinion by Judge Giles
Rich—who played a leading role in drafting the 1952 Patent Act—holding
that two patent applications involving living organisms (bacteria) were
patent eligible. 55 It was then repeated, in isolation, by the Supreme Court
48. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (stating that the application is “subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title”); see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 621 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
(explaining that this language includes the requirement that “the patent also be novel, § 102, and
nonobvious, § 103”).
49. Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318–23, § 1 (1793).
50. 1952 Patent Act § 101, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952); see also Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. at 308–09. The 1930 Plant Patent Act added new asexually reproducing plants to the statutory
categories of patent eligibility. See Pub. L. No. 71-312, 46 Stat. 367 (1930). This language was moved
to another section in the 1952 Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2018).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2018).
52. The Senate and House Committee Reports explain that the word “process” was adopted to
avoid potential confusion and ambiguity, as the word “art” has a different meaning in the IP Clause
(“useful art”) and other places in the U.S. Code. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2398–99 (“[T]he word ‘art’ which appears in the present statute has been
changed to the word ‘process.’ Art . . . in the present statute has a different meaning than the words
‘useful art’ in the Constitution, and a different meaning than the use of the word ‘art’ in other places
in the statutes, and it is interpreted by the courts to be practically synonymous with process or method.
The word ‘process’ has been used to avoid the necessity of explanation that the word ‘art’ as used in
this place means ‘process or method,’ and that it does not mean the same thing as the word ‘art’ in
other places.”).
53. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
161, 176–77 (1994).
54. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 6 (1952).
55. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 955 (C.C.P.A. 1979). Notably, even Judge Rich did not believe
§ 101 extended to all innovations and improvements created by humans. See Giles S. Rich, The
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in Chakrabarty, 56 and then again the following year in Diehr. 57 Since
then, this language has been quoted over 50 times by lower federal courts.
But the full passage as it appears in the original House and Senate
committee reports for the 1952 Patent Act suggest the scope of patent
eligibility is not so broad as some have read it. 58 The fourth and final
paragraph of the relevant section states: “A person may have ‘invented’ a
machine or manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that
is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under 101 unless the
conditions of the title are fulfilled.” 59
Several things are apparent when the “anything under the sun”
language is read in context. One, the quoted language refers only to the
statutory classes of “machine” or “manufacture.” It does not apply to
“process” or “composition of matter”—and the former is particularly
important, as most of the Court’s patent eligibility decisions involve
process claims. 60 Two, the final clause makes clear that any machine or
manufacture (like all inventions) must satisfy the other statutory
requirements for patentability, including novelty, nonobviousness, and
adequate disclosure. 61 As a result, the scope of statutory patent eligibility
clearly falls short of literally anything developed by humans. 62
Principles of Patentability, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 393–94 (1960) (“Section 101 . . . enumerates
the categories of inventions subject to patenting. Of course, not every kind of invention can be
patented. Invaluable though it may be to individuals, the public, and the national defense, the
invention of a more effective organization of the materials in, and the techniques of teaching a course
in physics, chemistry, or Russian is not a patentable invention because it is outside the enumerated
[statutory] categories . . . . Also outside that group is one of the greatest inventions of our time, the
diaper service.”).
56. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
57. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981).
58. See Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Peter S. Menell and Michael J. Meurer in Support of
Respondent, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), 2009 WL 3199629, at *22 (“[R]ead in context,
the ‘anything under the sun’ snippet does not stand for the proposition that Congress intended the
broadest possible scope of patentable subject matter.”).
59. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6; S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 6.
60. This is reinforced by the fact that two paragraphs earlier, the committee reports separately
explain the definition of “process” in the 1952 Patent Act. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent
Method Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1001 (2017) (summarizing the law’s treatment of process
patents).
61. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6; S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 6; see also David O. Taylor,
Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 172–73 (2016) (“In this way, the Senate and
House Reports explain that . . . . for a patent to be issued, the inventor must comply not only with the
patentability requirements of § 101, but also with the patentability requirements of §§ 102 and 103.”).
62. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 642 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Viewed as a
whole, it seems clear that this language does not purport to explain that ‘anything under the sun’ is
patentable. Indeed, the language may be understood to state the exact opposite: that ‘[a] person may
have invented . . . anything under the sun,’ but that thing is not necessarily patentable under section
101.”).
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The most recent major amendment to the Patent Act, the LeahySmith America Invents Act (AIA), 63 added two narrow exceptions that
impact patent eligibility. First, it limited patent protection for tax
avoidance strategies, which had previously been criticized by both IP and
tax scholars, 64 by declaring them to be within the scope of the prior art. 65
Second, it provided that “no patent may issue on a claim directed to or
encompassing a human organism.” 66 Section 101 itself, however,
remained unchanged.
C.

Supreme Court Patent Eligibility Decisions Prior to the Burger
Court

The first U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding patent eligibility is
Le Roy v. Tatham (1852). 67 The patent at issue in that case claimed and
described an improved method for manufacturing metal pipes. Regarding
patent eligibility, the Court explained:
[A] principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a
fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented,
as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right. Nor can an
exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be discovered in
addition to those already known. Through the agency of machinery a
new steam power may be said to have been generated. But no one can
appropriate this power exclusively to himself, under the patent laws. The
63. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) [hereinafter
AIA].
64. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 940–51 (2010); Wade M. Chumney et al., Patents Gone Wild: An
Ethical Examination and Legal Analysis of Tax-Related and Tax Strategy Patents, 46 AM. BUS. L.J.
343 (2009); Richard S. Gruner, When Worlds Collide: Tax Planning Method Patents Meet Tax
Practice Making Attorneys the Latest Patent Infringers, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 33 (2008);
Brant J. Hellwig, Questioning the Wisdom of Patent Protection for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV.
1005 (2007); Katherine J. Strandburg, What if There Were a Business Method Use Exemption to
Patent Infringement?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 245 (2008).
65. Id. § 14. The AIA limited patenting of tax avoidance strategies in a convoluted way; rather
than directly amending § 101 to declare them ineligible for patent protection, it instead provided that
such patents “shall be deemed insufficient to differentiate a claimed invention from the prior art.” Id.
§ 14(a). It also did not preclude the patenting of “a method, apparatus, technology, computer program,
product, or system” for preparing or filing a tax return, or if “used solely for financial management.”
Id. § 14(c).
66. AIA § 33(a). The exception appears to be intended to codify USPTO policy to prohibit the
patenting of human embryos, human-animal chimeras, and human clones. See generally Yaniv Heled,
On Patenting Human Organisms Or How the Abortion Wars Feed into the Ownership Fallacy, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 241 (2014); Ava Caffarini, Comment, Directed to or Encompassing a Human
Organism: How Section 33 of the America Invents Act May Threaten the Future of Biotechnology, 12
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 768 (2013).
67. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 4

928

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[53:915

same may be said of electricity, and of any other power in nature, which
is alike open to all, and may be applied to useful purposes by the use of
machinery.
In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and concentrate
natural agencies, constitute the invention. The elements of the power
exist; the invention is not in discovering them, but in applying them to
useful objects. 68

This statement, though dicta, has resonated through the years, having been
cited by the Court in modern patent eligibility decisions. 69
The following year, the Supreme Court addressed the patentability
of Samuel Morse’s electromagnetic telegraph in O’Reilly v. Morse. 70
While the first seven claims of Morse’s patent were upheld, the Court held
that claim eight was unpatentable. This claim, which was sweeping in
scope, stated:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of
machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the
essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric
or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed
for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any
distances, being a new application of that power of which I claim to be
the first inventor or discoverer. 71

The Court held that this claim was unpatentable because it went far
beyond what Morse had actually invented or discovered, by seeking to
claim “the exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power
is the electric or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing
intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a distance.” 72 It expressed
concern that upholding such a broad, unsupported right to exclude could
preempt work by other inventors who “may discover a mode of writing or
printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without
68. Id. at 175.
69. See Alan J. Heinrich & Christopher T. Abernethy, The Myriad Reasons to Hit “Reset” on
Patent-Eligibility Jurisprudence, 47 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 117, 133 (2013) (calling this language
“sweeping dicta”); Paxton M. Lewis, Note, The Conflation of Patent Eligibility and Obviousness:
Alice’s Substitution of Section 103, 2017 UTAH L. REV. ONLAW 13, 16–17 (“Le Roy’s famous quote
is often viewed as the holding of the case, but it is simply dicta in a case where the Court chose to
ignore the patent eligibility issue and focus on novelty . . . .”); Harold C. Wegner, Cabining The 800
Pound Faux Stare Decisis Gorilla in the Room of Patent Eligibility, LAIPLA (Nov. 23, 2016),
http://www.laipla.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/PatentEligibilityNov23.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GNX7-3SAW].
70. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
71. Id. at 112.
72. Id.
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using any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s
specification.” 73 Ultimately, the Court rejected claim eight.74
In Tilghman v. Proctor (1881), 75 the patentee claimed a process of
separating fat into its component parts by subjecting it to extreme heat
under pressure. 76 The Court held the invention was patent eligible, stating:
That a patent can be granted for a process, there can be no doubt. The
patent law is not confined to new machines and new compositions of
matter, but extends to any new and useful art or manufacture. A
manufacturing process is clearly an art, within the meaning of the law. 77

This holding, standing alone, is “fairly unremarkable” 78—the claim
covered an industrial process of the sort that has been widely patented
both before and since Tilghman. But the Court continued on,
distinguishing the patent-in-suit from Morse’s claim eight on the grounds
that the latter was unpatentable
because it was regarded by the court as being not for a process, but for
a mere principle. It amounted to . . . a claim of the exclusive use of one
of the powers of nature for a particular purpose. It was not a claim of
any particular machinery, nor a claim of any particular process for
utilizing the power; but a claim of the power itself . . . . 79

Over 50 years later, the Court reiterated that fundamental scientific
principles, standing alone, are not patent eligible. In Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America (1939), 80 the patentee claimed
an antenna configuration for the transmission of radio waves. 81 At the
time, it was widely known that a particular equation called Abraham’s
formula could predict the angle of radio activity from a charged wire of a
fixed length. 82 The claimed invention used Abraham’s formula to
73. Id. at 113; see generally DAVID CROWLEY, COMMUNICATIONS IN HISTORY (Peter Urquhart
& Paul Heyer, eds., 7th ed. 2018).
74. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (citing
O’Reilly as support for the statement that “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are
not patentable”); Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing O’Reilly as support for the statement that “[t]he relevant principle of law excludes
from patent protection laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” (internal quotations,
ellipses, and brackets omitted)).
75. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881).
76. Id. at 708.
77. Id. at 722.
78. Heinrich & Abernethy, supra note 69, at 139.
79. Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 726–27.
80. Mackay Radio & Tel. Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
81. Id. at 88.
82. Id. at 93–94.
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determine the angle of the V-shaped wires in the antenna. 83 The Court
held that the invention was patent eligible, stating that “[w]hile a scientific
truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a
novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific
truth may be.” 84
Nearly a decade later, the Court struck down a patent on eligibility
grounds for (possibly) the first time since Morse almost a century prior.
In Funk Bros. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. (1948), 85 the patentee claimed to have
discovered that a combination of certain strains of root-nodule bacteria
did not mutually inhibit the absorption of nitrogen in leguminous plants,
and thus could be used together in a single mixture for numerous
species. 86 The Supreme Court held that this combination of bacteria, by
itself, was not patent eligible because “[t]heir qualities are the work of
nature.” 87 It explained:
The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the
qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men.
They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon
of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If
there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end. 88

In the majority’s view, the patentee had merely discovered a naturallyoccurring attribute of the claimed bacteria and then combined them into a
single product. 89 The individual strains of bacteria were unchanged and
“perform in their natural way,” and the combination of strains “does not
improve in any their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature
originally provided and act quite independently of any effort of the
patentee.” 90 As a result, even though the combination of bacteria was
admittedly useful and apparently novel, it was “no more than the
discovery of some of the handiwork of nature and hence is not
patentable.” 91

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 94.
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
Id. at 128–30.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Id.
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III. A DEEP DIVE INTO THE BURGER COURT’S
PATENT ELIGIBILITY DECISIONS
This Part discusses in depth the main patent eligibility decisions of
the Burger Court (1969–1986)—namely, Gottschalk v. Benson, Parker v.
Flook, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and Diamond v. Diehr. It also covers
Diamond v. Bradley, a lesser-known companion case to Diehr often
overlooked by both courts and scholars. For each of these cases, the
information available from the public record is supplemented by archival
material from the hitherto-unused case files of Justice Lewis Powell.
The Burger Court era is important for the development of modern
patent eligibility jurisprudence for several reasons. First, these cases
comprehensively discuss and apply the judicially created exceptions to
patentable subject matter: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas. Second, they address—with conflicting reasoning—the
relationship between patent eligibility and the other requirements for
patentability such as novelty and nonobviousness, an issue which
continues to be controversial. Third, the Flook case in particular has been
relied on as support for the current requirement in cases like Mayo and
Alice that there must be an inventive application of one of the judicially
created exceptions to patentability. 92
Each case is discussed in chronological order below, starting with a
summary of the claimed invention and the procedural history prior to
reaching the Supreme Court. Then it addresses the Court’s internal
deliberations and decision-making process at both the cert petition and
merits stages, based upon both publicly available materials and Justice
Powell’s archival records. Finally, it concludes with a summary of the
Court’s decision in each case, including any concurring and dissenting
opinions.
A.

Gottschalk v. Benson
1. Facts and Procedural History

In 1963, Gary Benson and Arthur Tabbot filed a patent application
for a process that converted one type of binary code to another through
the use of a computer program. 93 The patent examiner rejected the claims
as unpatentable under § 101, explaining that the claimed invention did not

92. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 222 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71–73 (2012).
93. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972).
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constitute a “process.” 94 The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(BPAI) 95 affirmed the examiner’s rejection in 1968, basing its decision on
the USPTO’s consistent practice that computer programs were not
patentable subject matter under § 101. 96
Benson appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA), 97 which in 1971 reversed and found the claim patentable.98 The
CCPA distinguished Benson from previous computer software cases
because “[t]he claims in this case are directed solely to the art of dataprocessing itself whereas in [the previous] cases some subsidiary or
additional art was involved.” 99
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
The USPTO filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court, which was granted in 1972. 100 According to a bench memorandum
from Justice Powell’s law clerk, the USPTO sought review of the CCPA’s
decision because it had deviated from the USPTO’s consistent practice of
denying patents for computer programs. 101 Historically, the courts had
considered computer programs to be “mental processes,” which were not
patentable. 102 The Solicitor General contended that mental processes were
not patent eligible because they were “basic instruments of scientific and
technological development and, their free exchange [wa]s, therefore, not
to be hindered by the granting of patent monopolies.” 103 As summarized
in the law clerk’s memorandum, the USPTO also offered numerous policy
94. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 684 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
95. The Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences (BPAI) was an administrative court within the
PTO that heard appeals from adverse examiner decisions regarding patent applications. See
35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2006) (amended 2012). Under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, the BPAI was
replaced with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) effective September 16, 2012. AIA § 7, Pub.
L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 313 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6(a)).
96. In re Benson, 441 F.2d at 686.
97. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) was a federal court that had jurisdiction
over appeals regarding USPTO decisions on patent applications. The CCPA was abolished in 1982,
and its jurisdiction, judges, and docket were transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 36–
38 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295).
98. In re Benson, 441 F.2d at 688.
99. Id. at 686.
100. Gottschalk v. Benson, 405 U.S. 915, 915 (1972).
101. See Supreme Court Case File, Gottschalk v. Benson, No. 71-485 (1972), in Lewis F.
Powell,
Jr.
Archive,
Box
375/Folder
28
[hereinafter
Benson
Case
File],
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles/644/ [https://perma.cc/WK32-55TF].
102. Guidelines to Examination of Programs, 829 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 1, 1 (1966).
103. Memorandum on Patentability of Computer Programs, Gottschalk v. Benson (No. 71-485),
at 2, in Benson Case File, supra note 101, at 3.
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reasons for denying patents to computer programs, including that patent
rights would “impede the future growth of the computer software business
due to the lack of free interchange of ideas”; that “patent infringement
suits can be anticipated . . . to [create] confusion and impose additional
costs”; that “[t]he computer program industry grew phenomenally without
the protection of patent monopolies and it is relatively clear that the
monopoly incentive is not necessary to assure maximum industry
development”; and that “any change in the status quo should have come
from Congress in the form of legislation rather than by change of statutory
interpretation by the CCPA.” 104
Benson, the patent applicant, responded that (1) if an inventor is able
to meet the requirements for patentability, he should be given the same
statutory protection as any other industry; (2) there will not be thousands
of applications and lawsuits because it will be difficult for most programs
to fulfil all of the requirements for patentability; and (3) “the decision is
not a departure from prior law.” 105
In handwritten comments on a bench memorandum regarding
certiorari, Justice Powell noted that there was “[n]o controlling case law”
on this issue.” 106 He indicated that he agreed with the USPTO’s position
that patents should not be granted for computer software “unless they
serve some purpose to protect the growth of the industry.” 107 He further
agreed with his clerk’s assessment that the Court was not “best equipped
to handle this problem. Resolution of the policy issues could best be
handled by Congress where their broad fact-gathering processes will
allow full consideration to the myriad technological facts, historical data,
and predictions for the future of the industry.” However, Justice Powell
commented that it will be hard for a new bill concerning this matter to get
through Congress without an “organized premise.” 108
Ultimately, Justice Powell was “inclined to agree with” his clerk’s
assessment that certiorari should not be granted because the “issue is too
complex for Court to decide,” and instead “Congress should clarify [the]
law.” 109 However, he also indicated that “cert. should be granted [and]
[the CCPA] reversed if the record supports [the] view that a ‘computer
program’ is not a ‘process within meaning of statute.’” 110 Subsequently,

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 2 (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
Id. at 4.
Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
Id. at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
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in an undated memo, Justice Powell indicated that he would recuse
himself from Benson, as he owned stock in IBM, which had filed an
amicus brief in support of the USPTO’s position. 111
At a conference on February 18, 1972, the Court took a preliminary
vote to determine whether to grant certiorari.112 Justices Blackmun,
White, and Douglas voted to grant the petition; Justices Rehnquist and
Marshall voted to deny the petition; and Justices Stewart, Brennan, Powell
and Chief Justice Burger passed on deciding the petition at this point. 113
On February 22, 1972, the Court granted the writ of certiorari. 114 The
order granting certiorari indicated that Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
Stewart did not participate in the decision.115
3. Supreme Court Decision
On November 20, 1972, the participating Justices unanimously
reversed the CCPA, holding that Benson’s invention was not patenteligible subject matter under § 101.116 Writing for the Court, Justice
Douglas explained that the claimed process was a series of steps that could
be performed solely in the mind, without the need for use of a computer. 117
Citing Le Roy, Morse, Mackay Radio, and Funk Brothers as support, the
Court reasoned that “one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect
that would be the result if [the claimed process] were patented” because
the algorithm “has no substantial practical application except in
connection with a digital computer.” 118 As a result, “the patent would
wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect be a
patent on the algorithm itself,” which was impermissible. 119 However, the
Court also appeared to leave the door open for patents where algorithms

111. Memorandum to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Gottschalk v. Benson (No. 71-485)
(handwritten note of Justice Powell), in Benson Case File, supra note 101, at 6; see also Brief for
Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp., Gottschalk v. Benson, 405 U.S. 915 (1972)
(No. 71-485), 1972 WL 136233. As a result of Justice Powell’s recusal from this case, the Benson
Case File, supra note 101, was quite short.
112. Certiorari Vote Tally Sheet, Gottschalk v. Benson (No. 71-485), in Benson Case File, supra
note 101, at 9.
113. Id. Justice Powell’s handwritten notes on this document state that he “took no part” in the
certiorari decision. Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
114. Gottschalk v. Benson, 405 U.S. 915, 915 (1972).
115. Id.
116. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72–73 (1972).
117. Id. at 67–68.
118. Id. at 71.
119. Id. at 72.
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were used in combination with “a particular machine or apparatus,” or
were used to “change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’” 120
The Court’s opinion also echoed some of Justice Powell’s thoughts
regarding the desirability of legislative action, stating that “[i]t may be
that the patent laws should be extended to cover [computer] programs,”
and noting the power of Congress to hold hearings and solicit a variety of
viewpoints regarding this issue. 121 But this was ultimately “a policy mater
to which [the Court] [is] not competent to speak.” 122
B.

Parker v. Flook
1. Facts and Procedural History

While Benson was pending, Dale Flook, an employee of the oil
company Atlantic Richfield Company, filed a patent application for a
“Method for Updating Alarm Limits.” 123 In this process, an alarm limit—
a number that indicates the presence of an abnormal condition—for a
catalytic conversion is periodically recalculated based on updated
variables such as temperature and time. 124 For example, if a catalytic
converter was operating within these calculated limits, then it was
operating normally. 125 When the calculated value falls outside of the
alarm limit, then an alarm will be sounded. 126 The applicant conceded that
the only novel feature of the claimed method is the mathematical formula
used. 127
Initially, the examiner rejected Flook’s application under § 101
because “while the claimed invention is clearly a method useful within
the technological arts, the only part of [the] claimed invention which is
not conventional is the particular algorithm used to adjust the alarm
value.” 128 The examiner’s decision relied on In re Christensen, a CCPA
decision issued shortly after Benson, which held that a process to
determine the porosity of a subsurface formation was unpatentable
because the mathematical formula in the profess was the sole point of
novelty. 129 Based on Christensen, the examiner concluded that Flook’s
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 71.
Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 72.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
Id. at 585.
Id. at 586.
Id.
Id. at 585.
In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 22 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1394–95 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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process was “not statutory subject matter . . . notwithstanding the fact that
[it is] within the technological arts.” 130
Flook appealed this rejection to the BPAI, arguing the “express
language in Christensen limited the holding in that case to claims in which
the solution of the novel equation [wa]s the last step of a claimed
process.” 131 The BPAI rejected Flook’s “last step” interpretation and
agreed with the examiner’s decision to deny the patent. 132 Flook then
appealed to the CCPA, which reversed the BPAI’s rejection. 133 The CCPA
distinguished this case from Benson because “[t]he present claims do not
preempt the formula or algorithm contained therein, because solution of
the algorithm, per se, would not infringe the claims.” 134
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
On November 2, 1977, the USPTO filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari. 135 The USPTO argued that the CCPA’s decision to reverse the
examiner’s rejection under § 101 relied on a strained interpretation of
Benson. 136 It also asserted that the CCPA’s decision conflicted with Funk
Brothers because the only point of novelty—the algorithm—was an
unpatentable idea or scientific principle. 137 Furthermore, it claimed that
the CCPA’s decision “will have a debilitating effect on the rapidly
expanding computer ‘software’ industry, and will require [the USPTO] to
process thousands of additional patent applications.” 138 The Solicitor
General urged the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in this case because
Benson needed to be clarified in light of confusion in the lower courts and
uncertainty about how to apply its holding. 139 In addition, the Solicitor
General argued that a clearer ruling would be beneficial for the computer
industry. 140

130. In re Flook, 559 F.2d at 22.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 23 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972)).
134. Id.
135. Brief for Petitioner, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (No. 77-642), 1978 WL 206636,
at *1–2 (noting the filing date of the cert petition in Flook).
136. See Supreme Court Case File, Parker v. Flook, No. 77-642 (1978), in Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Archive,
Box
488/Folder
15–17
[hereinafter
Flook
Case
File],
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles/645 [https://perma.cc/MBF6-6HDF].
137. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at *19–20.
138. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587–88 (1978).
139. Preliminary Memorandum, Parker v. Flook (No. 77-642), at 1 (Jan. 13, 1978), in Flook
Case File, supra note 136, at 2.
140. Id.
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On January 4, 1978, the cert pool clerk 141 circulated a memorandum
regarding the petition. 142 After summarizing the facts, procedural history,
and the parties’ arguments regarding certiorari, the memorandum
contended that Flook’s claim was distinguishable from Benson and
implied that certiorari should be denied, stating:
The [Solicitor General] is reading much more into Benson that is there.
The Court was primarily concerned with the almost limitless scope of a
patent involving a mathematical formula that was not tied to any
specified end-use. That problem is, of course, not present here. I do not
see in Benson any requirement that “the process be carried out with a
specific apparatus devised to implement the newly-discovered idea.” . . .
[T]he Court strongly indicated in Benson its belief that Congress was
the superior institution to resolve the complex patents [sic] questions
raised by the new computer technology; the complexities of this case
(complexities at least to a novice in the field) impress me as supporting
that belief. 143

In separate, undated one-page document apparently written by one
of Justice Powell’s own clerks, the clerk recommended granting certiorari.
The clerk’s memorandum acknowledged that “CCPA’s interpretation of
Gottschalk v. Benson does not seem totally out of line” because the Court
had “stressed at least twice that that the algorithms [in Benson] were not
tied to any particular end product,” and here “the claim is limited to the
use of the algorithm in a particular end-use and with a particular
apparatus.” 144 However, it also noted the importance of this issue because
“uncertainty as to the meaning of Gottschalk is delaying and confusing
the disposition of many applications for patents on computer programs,”
and “Gottschalk simply does not answer the question presented in this
petition, but it seems to be one that should be answered.” 145
Justice Powell ultimately agreed with his clerk’s recommendation,
stating in a handwritten note that Flook was “a patent case that I don’t
understand. But [the Solicitor General] says doubt and confusion as to
141. Starting in the early 1970s, in response to a rapidly-expanding increase in requests for
Supreme Court discretionary review, a number of the Justices (including Justice Powell) agreed to
“pool” their clerks so that only one clerk would be required to write a memorandum in response to
each petition for certiorari, and this memorandum would be shared with all participating chambers.
See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari
Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 952–53 (2007) (reviewing TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE
MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006)).
142. Preliminary Memorandum at 1–6, in Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 2–7.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Typewritten Note, Parker v. Flook (No. 77-642), in Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 2.
145. Id.
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[the] meaning of Gottschalk v. Benson is widespread, and we should
clarify.” 146 At a conference on January 13, 1978, Justices White, Stevens,
and Blackmun voted to grant the petition for certiorari; Justices Stewart,
Brennan and Powell voted “join 3”; 147 and Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist voted to deny the petition. 148 As a result, the Court
agreed to review the CCPA’s decision. 149
3. Merits Stage
In its briefs at the merits stage, the government offered two reasons
for why Flook’s patent application should not be granted. 150 First, it
contended that Benson required a claim containing a mathematical
algorithm to include (1) a specific apparatus to implement the novel idea,
and (2) the claim must only apply to a specific end-use or technological
field. 151 Here, the government argued that the first element was not
fulfilled because the calculation could be carried out in existing
computers. 152 Second, the government argued that the CCPA’s decision
conflicted with Funk Brothers, where the court found that the application
of a newly discovered scientific principle must be applied in an inventive
way to be patentable. 153 Here, every step in the claim, other than the
algorithm, fell within the prior art. 154
At oral argument, the government challenged the CCPA’s
interpretation of Benson. 155 Responding to Justice Stewart, Deputy
146. Preliminary Memorandum at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Powell), in Flook Case File,
supra note 136, at 2.
147. A “join 3” vote means that the Justice will prove the fourth vote to grant certiorari if three
other Justices agree that a case merits review. See David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four,
the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 782 (1997)
(explaining a “join 3” decision).
148. Certiorari Vote Tally Sheet, Parker v. Flook (No. 77-642) (Jan. 13, 1978), in Flook Case
File, supra note 136, at 9.
149. Parker v. Flook, 434 U.S. 1033, 1033 (1978).
150. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at *9–10, *13–23.
151. Id.
152. See id. at *16–17 (“[Flook]’s method does nothing more than provide a different
mathematical procedure for calculating alarm limiting values on variables to be used in chemical
processing, just as Benson’s method provided a different mathematical procedure for calculating the
pure binary equivalents of BCD numbers to be used in data processing. Neither method involves
specific apparatus newly devised to implement the mathematical procedure. Rather, [Flook]’s
method . . . involves computing apparatus that is old in the art; [Flook] expressly admitted . . . that
the mathematical algorithm can be . . . ‘carried out in existing computers long in use’ . . . .”).
153. Id. at *19–23.
154. See id. at *22 (“The only inventive contribution in [Flook]’s method is the mathematical
formula by which alarm-limit values are calculated.”).
155. Justice Powell’s Handwritten Notes from Oral Argument, Parker v. Flook (No. 77-642), at
2 (argued Apr. 25, 1978), in Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 11.
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Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace—representing the government—
agreed that there could be a “combination patent” where an invention
involved an unpatentable concept, but argued that there is not a
“combination patent” here. 156 He also argued that this was an unpatentable
process patent because the only new claim is the formula, and the entire
process taken together was not novel as the formula was already being
done by hand. 157
In response, Flook contended that his application differed from
Benson because his claim did not solely comprise of a mathematical
algorithm; rather, it described an industrial process that incorporated the
algorithm. 158 Further, one of the concerns in Benson was that granting the
patent would give the applicant a broad monopoly because the
applicability of the formula for converting binary code could be wider
than predicted. 159 Here, in contrast, the patent would only apply to the use
of the algorithm in a particular application (hydrocarbon cracking)
because a post-solution activity was included. 160
In a post-argument bench memorandum dated April 26, 1978, one of
Justice Powell’s law clerks stated:
The case absolutely baffles me. It is difficult for several reasons. First,
the patent laws generally are new to me, and I do not understand how
some of the basic concepts and how the various sections of the statute
inter-relate. Second, because of my unfamiliarity with patent law
precedent, I am not able to reason by analogy from known instances to
the issue in this case. I cannot compare the subject matter of this patent
to other patentable subjects because I do not know of the other subjects.
Finally, I do not understand exactly what [Flook]’s invention does. I do
not understand how the mathematical equation works; nor do I
understand exactly how it controls the catalytic conversion process. 161

Justice Powell wrote in response that his law clerk “has lots of
company.” 162

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Memorandum to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Parker v. Flook (No. 77-642), at 5–6 (Apr.
26, 1978), in Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 20–21.
159. Id. at 7.
160. See Brief of the Respondent, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (No. 77-642), 1978 WL
223450, at *17 (contending that other uses of the algorithm “would obviously not be in any way
encompassed or preempted by [Flook]’s claims”).
161. Memorandum to Justice Powell at 1–2 (Apr. 26, 1978), in Flook Case File, supra note 136,
at 14, 16.
162. Id. at 2 (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
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The clerk’s memorandum then went on to summarize the claimed
invention, noting that “[i]t seems to be agreed by [the parties] that the
equation in the second step of the claim is novel,” even though “[o]ne of
the amici disputes” this, and two law clerks from other chambers with
math backgrounds agreed “that the algorithm is not new. 163 “Yet [the
parties] have proceeded on the premise not only that the equation is new,
but that it is the only thing novel about [Flook]’s purported invention.” 164
Ultimately, the clerk concluded that “[i]n the long run, [Flook] probably
should not be able to get a patent,” either because the “whole claim is nonstatutory subject matter under § 101; or under either § 102 or § 103, his
claim is not novel or obvious because the only thing about it is the novel
algorithm, which itself is not patentable.” 165
After considering these issues, Justice Powell commented in an
undated, handwritten note that that he was tentatively inclined to
reverse. 166 He noted that “to the limited extent that I understand Benson
and Funk [Brothers], they appear to support the gov[ernmen]t.” 167
Ultimately, Justice Powell noted “[i]t is not clear to me that [Flook] has
done anything more than ‘discover’ an equation that alone achieves
nothing concrete. . . . If an equation cannot be patented alone under § 101,
it can’t bootstrap itself simply be being added to other non-patentable
steps.” 168
At the post-argument conference on April 28, 1978, the Justices
initially voted to affirm the CCPA (and thus find Flook’s claims patent
eligible) in a 5–4 vote. 169 Below are each Justice’s votes on patent
eligibility, 170 along with a summary of Justice Powell’s handwritten notes
from the conference:
Chief Justice Burger: Patent eligible. “Op[inion] of [CCPA] is
inadequate and meaningless. The claims here is more than an ‘idea’ and
thus Benson does not control. [Solicitor General]’s brief errs in relying
on Funk—which is not helpful. A reversal here would foreclose a wide

163. Id. at 3. The memorandum further notes that the two clerks said “that when they looked at
the equation they were astonished that anyone could contend that it is new.” Id.
164. Id. at 4.
165. Id. at 4–5.
166. Justice Powell’s Pre-Conference Handwritten Note, Parker v. Flook (No. 77-642) at 2, in
Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 34.
167. Id. at 3.
168. Id.
169. Justice Powell’s Conference Notes, Parker v. Flook (No. 77-642), at 1 (Apr. 28, 1978), in
Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 36.
170. For Flook, a vote in favor of patent eligibility was a vote to affirm the CCPA, while a vote
against patent eligibility was a vote to reverse.
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range of patents in computer field. This seems to be a ‘process’ within
§ 101.”
Justice Brennan: Not patent eligible. “Benson did not create new law.
Ideas never have been patentable. The idea here is a means of
accomplishing a process already known in a more expeditious manner.
There is no real change in the technology.”
Justice Stewart: Patent eligible. “Benson held that a natural subject or
idea can’t be patented. But many patentable processes involve several
elements[,] some of which are natural. The sole issue is whether the
‘claim’ is patentable under § 101. Other sections may present issues for
another day. Other opinions by [CCPA] . . . are helpful in applying
Benson. [CCPA] was clearly right.”
Justice White: Patent eligible. “Affirm. Agrees with [Justice Stewart].
Gov[ernmen]t is trying to limit patents in this area unreasonable. Fact
that same result was being obtained by hand is immaterial at this stage.
This can come up later on an ‘obviousness’ claim.”
Justice Marshall: Not patent eligible. No further notes.
Justice Blackmun: Patent eligible. “Have ‘flip-flopped.’ Doesn’t agree
with rationale of the opinion of [CCPA]—but on balance would
affirm[]. Claim is patentable under [§] 101. May lose later under
[§§] 102 and 103.”
Justice Powell: Not patent eligible. “[V]ery tentative.”
Justice Rehnquist: Patent eligible. “Agree with [Justice Stewart].”
Justice Stevens: Not patent eligible. “Can come out either way with a
principled opinion. . . . Benson can be read either way. Interpretation of
word ‘discover’ may be controlling. Two helpful cases: Printing Press
case (see briefs) onto ‘law of nature.’ Mere fact that an algorithm is
involved is not controlling. If this algorithm is not novel, there has been
no discovery. Affirmance here would create enormous problems for
patent office.” 171

However, shortly after the conference, Justice Blackmun changed his
vote, resulting in a tentative 5–4 vote to reverse. In a memorandum
circulated to the entire conference that same day, Justice Blackmun stated:
“After further consideration, I change my vote from ‘tentatively to affirm’

171.

Justice Powell’s Conference Notes at 1–3, in Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 36–38.
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to ‘tentatively to reverse.’” 172 Justice Powell added a handwritten note to
the memorandum noting that “[t]his makes the vote 5 to 4 to reverse.” 173
Justice Stevens circulated the first draft of the opinion for the Court
on June 9, 1978. 174 Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Powell all
swiftly joined this opinion. 175 On June 12, 1978, Justice White—who cast
an initial vote at conference to affirm—indicated that he was now
tentatively planning to reverse, noting in a memorandum to Justice
Stevens that “I cast a very shaky vote to affirm in this case but have been
unsettled about it. Your opinion, which I have examined with some care,
now impresses me as the better view, but I shall await the dissent before
coming to rest.” 176 Justice White subsequently joined Justice Stevens’
majority opinion, 177 resulting in the final 6–3 vote to reverse in Flook.
4. Court’s Decision
The Court’s opinion in Flook was issued on June 22, 1978. It
reversed the CCPA, holding that the claimed invention was not eligible
for patenting under § 101. After summarizing the claimed invention—
including that “[t]he only difference between the conventional methods of
changing alarm limits and that described in respondent’s application rests
in the second step—the mathematical algorithm or formula” 178—and the
procedural history, the Court’s analysis begins with case law, as “[t]he
plain language of § 101 does not answer the question.” 179 Citing Le Roy,

172. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Chief Justice Warren Burger, Parker v.
Flook (No. 77-642) (Apr. 28, 1978), in Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 39.
173. Id. (handwritten note by Justice Powell).
174. First Draft, Opinion for the Court, Parker v. Flook (No. 77-642) at 1–14 (circulated June
9, 1978), in Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 41–54.
175. Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., to Justice John Paul Stevens, Parker v.
Flook (No. 77-642) (June 8, 1978), in Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 40; Memorandum from
Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice John Paul Stevens, Parker v. Flook (No. 77-642) (June 12,
1978), in Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 58; Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to
Justice John Paul Stevens, Parker v. Flook (June 13, 1978), in Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 60.
Justice Powell’s case file for Flook does not contain a join memo from Justice Thurgood Marshall,
but a handwritten note indicates that he joined Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court on June 7, 1978.
Handwritten Note by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Parker v. Flook (No. 77-642), in Flook Case File,
supra note 136, at 62.
176. Memorandum from Justice Byron R. White to Justice John Paul Stevens, Parker v. Flook,
(No. 77-642) (June 12, 1978), in Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 57.
177. Memorandum from Justice Byron R. White to Justice John Paul Stevens, Parker v. Flook
(No. 77-642) (June 12, 1978), in Flook Case File, supra note 136, at 59.
178. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1978); see also id. at 588 (“We also assume, since
[Flook] does not challenge the examiner’s finding, that the formula is the only novel feature of [the
claimed] method.”).
179. Id. at 588–89.
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Mackay Radio, and Funk Brothers in support, Justice Stevens’ opinion
declares that “[t]he process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm,
must be new and useful” to be patent eligible. 180 “Indeed, the novelty of
the mathematical algorithm is not a determining factor at all,” because “as
one of the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work,’ it is treated
as though it were . . . part of the prior art.” 181 Then, citing Morse, it
explains that because “a scientific principle cannot be patented,” it must
be treated “as if the principle or mathematical formula were well
known.” 182
The Court’s opinion then responds to several of Flook’s contentions.
First, it rejects the claim that “if a process application implements a
principle in some specific fashion, it automatically falls within the
patentable subject matter of § 101 and the substantive patentability of the
particular process can then be determined by the conditions of §§ 102 and
103.” 183 Such an approach “would make the determination of patentable
subject matter depend simply on the draftsman’s art.” 184 “The rule that the
discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented rests, not on the notion
that natural phenomena are not processes [under § 101], but rather on the
more fundamental understanding that they are not the kind of
‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.” 185
Second, the Court rejected Flook’s argument that the examiner
improperly rejected his claim because one of its components was
ineligible, explaining that “a patent claim must be considered as a
whole.” 186 Viewing the claim in its entirety, the Court explained:
[Flook]’s process is unpatentable . . . because once that algorithm is
assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a
whole, contains no patentable invention. . . . The chemical processes
involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons are well known, as are
the practice of monitoring the chemical process variables, the use of
alarm limits to trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be
recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers for “automatic
monitoring-alarming.” [Flook]’s application simply provides a new and
presumably better method for calculating alarm limit values. If we
assume that that method was also known, as we must under . . . Morse,
then [Flook]’s claim is, in effect, comparable to a claim that the formula
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 589–91.
Id. at 591–92 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
Id. at 592.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 594.
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2πr can be usefully applied in determining the circumference of a
wheel. 187

In a phrase echoed in later decisions, the Court declared that “the
discovery of . . . a phenomenon [of nature] cannot support a patent unless
there is some other inventive concept in its application.” 188 Finally, as in
Benson, the Court noted that “patent protection of certain novel and useful
computer programs” involved “[d]ifficult questions of policy,” and
suggested that Congress would be better suited to addressing this issue. 189
Writing for the three dissenters, Justice Stewart contended that
Benson was very narrow in scope, precluding only “claims for an
algorithm that ‘were not limited to any particular art or technology, to any
particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use.’” 190 In his
view, “[t]he present case is a far different one” than Benson because only
one step in Flook’s process, “if considered in isolation,” would not be
patent eligible. 191 The dissent criticized the majority for “importing into
its inquiry” of patent eligibility “under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of
novelty and [nonobviousness]” under §§ 102 and 103. 192
C.

Diamond v. Chakrabarty
1. Facts and Procedural History

Two separate cases regarding the patentability of living organisms—
In re Bergy and In re Chakrabarty—were consolidated by the Court, 193
but the Bergy case was mooted while the appeal was pending, 194 leaving
the patentability of Chakrabarty’s invention as the sole remaining issue.
In the first case, three scientists working for Upjohn (Bergy) filed a
patent application in 1974 claiming a biologically pure culture of the
microorganism Streptomyces vellosus, which was capable of producing
the antibiotic lincomycin in a recoverable quantity after fermentation in a
growth medium. 195 The examiner rejected this claim on the basis that it

187. Id. at 594–95.
188. Id. at 594.
189. Id. at 595–96.
190. Id. at 599 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
191. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
193. Diamond v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 924, 924 (1979).
194. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028, 1028 (1980) (vacating and remanding Bergy
to the CCPA with directions to dismiss the appeal as moot).
195. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1032 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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claimed a “product of nature” that was not patent eligible.196 Bergy
responded that the invention was a patentable manufacture under § 101
because the claimed microorganism “did not exist as a biologically pure
culture in nature.” 197 A majority of the BPAI affirmed the rejection,
holding that Bergy claimed a “a living organism,” which does not fall
within any of the statutory categories of patentable subject matter under
§ 101. 198 It explained:
We have extensively researched prior court decisions for guidance to the
question of whether or not a microorganism, being a living thing, is or
is not within the realm of statutory patentable subject matter, but, other
than possibly non-controlling dicta, have not found any case directly in
point.
It is our view that 35 U.S.C. 101 must be strictly construed and, when
so interpreted, precludes the patenting of a living organism. We reach
this conclusion on the basis that only those categories of subject matter
specifically enumerated in the statute are patentable and a living
organism does not fall within the scope of any of those categories
listed. 199

The BPAI majority also reasoned that the Plant Patent Act of 1930, 200
which authorized the issuance of patents for new, asexually reproduced
plants, supported its conclusion, as this statute would have been
superfluous if § 101 already authorized the patenting of living
organisms. 201 The dissenting member of the BPAI panel contended that
the claimed bacteria culture qualified as either a “composition” or
“manufacture” if other steps were necessary to treat the bacteria to obtain
the antibiotic. 202
On appeal, the CCPA reversed, holding in a 3–2 decision that the
claimed invention was patent eligible.203 Writing for the majority, Judge
Giles Rich argued that the biologically pure culture of Streptomyces
vellosus was not an unpatentable product of nature because it “does not
exist in, is not found in, and is not a product of, ‘nature.’ It is man-made
and can be produced only under carefully controlled laboratory

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 1032–33.
Id. at 1033.
Ex parte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. 78, 1976 WL 20961, at *1 (1976).
Id.
46 Stat. 703 (1930) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164).
Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. 78, 1976 WL 20961, at *1–2.
Id. at *2–3 (Katz, dissenting).
In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1032 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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conditions.” 204 Furthermore, the fact that the claimed invention included
a living organism did not make it patent ineligible, according to Judge
Rich, because “processes, one of the categories of patentable subject
matter specified in § 101, are . . . statutory subject matter notwithstanding
the employment therein of living organisms and their life processes.” 205
The fact that the microorganism in the claimed invention is alive is
“without legal significance” because it is “an industrial product used in an
industrial process.” 206 Judge Rich also contended that policy reasons
supported this outcome, as “microorganisms have come to be important
tools in the chemical industry, especially the pharmaceutical branch . . . .
It is because it is alive that it is useful.” 207 As a result, “[w]e think it is in
the public interest to include microorganisms within the terms
‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter’ in § 101.” 208 Dissenting,
Judges Miller and Baldwin agreed with the BPAI that the existence and
legislative history of the Plant Patent Act suggested that Congress
believed § 101 did not encompass living organisms, including
biologically pure culture of bacteria.209
The following year (1978), the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Bergy and vacated and remanded the CCPA’s decision in light of Flook. 210
In the second case, Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty, a microbiologist
working for General Electric (GE), sought to patent a geneticallymodified bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas that was capable of
breaking down hydrocarbons in crude oil. 211 Dr. Chakrabarty created this
new strain of bacteria by incorporating plasmids from other bacteria into
a single Pseudonomas cell, which gave the modified cell the capacity to
simultaneously degrade multiple components of crude oil more rapidly. 212
The examiner rejected claims to the bacteria itself 213 on the grounds that

204. Id. at 1035.
205. Id. at 1037.
206. Id. at 1038.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1039–42 (Miller, J., dissenting).
210. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902, 902 (1978).
211. In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 41 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
212. Id.
213. Id. Claim 7 of Chakrabarty’s application is illustrative: “A bacteria from the genus
Pseudomonas containing therein at least two stable energy-generating plasmids, each of said plasmids
providing a separate hydrocarbon degradative pathway.” Id. at 41–42. The examiner allowed two
other categories of claims in Chakrabarty’s patent application: process claims for the method of
producing the bacteria, and claims for an inoculum comprising a carrier material, such as straw, and
the new bacteria. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305–06 (1980).
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it was not patent eligible under § 101 for two reasons: (1) that it was a
product of nature, and (2) that the claim was drawn to a living organism. 214
The BPAI reversed the examiner on the first issue, thus agreeing with
Chakrabarty that the claimed bacteria were not naturally occurring, but
affirmed on the second issue. 215 The BPAI’s reasoning was similar to
Bergy, holding that the bacteria were living organisms and thus
unpatentable because § 101 “does not include living organisms.” 216 On
appeal, the CCPA reversed, citing its decision in Bergy as dispositive that
claims directed to microorganisms fall within § 101 and thus are patent
eligible. 217
The USPTO then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in Chakrabarty.
Shortly after this, the CCPA vacated its earlier judgment, recalled its
mandate, and restored the appeal to its calendar so that it could consider
it in conjunction with Bergy, which had been remanded back to the CCPA
following Flook. As a result, the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari
on August 25, 1978. 218
Following remand, the CCPA issued a lengthy decision addressing
both Bergy and Chakrabarty. 219 In a 3–2 decision, the court reaffirmed its
earlier decisions that both claimed inventions were patent eligible under
§ 101. Judge Rich’s opinion for the majority recounted the procedural
history of the two cases, the relevant constitutional and statutory text, and
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Flook. 220 After sharply criticizing
Flook, 221 the majority concluded that it had no impact on the issues
presented here. 222 The majority then “adhere[d] to [its] former decisions
that Bergy’s and Chakrabarty’s appealed claims define subject matter that
falls within the categories named in § 101” and thus are patent eligible. 223

214. In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d at 42.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 43.
218. Banner v. Chakrabarty, 439 U.S. 801, 801 (1978).
219. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979). The two cases were not formally consolidated,
but heard and decided together because “they involve only the same single question of law.” Id. at
955.
220. Id. at 956–67.
221. For instance, the CCPA contended that Flook “may have an unintended impact in putting
an untimely and unjustifiable end to long-standing proposition of law that patentability may be
predicated on discovering the cause of a problem even though, once that cause is known, the solution
is brought about by obvious means. Such causes may often be classed as laws of nature or their effects.
The potential for great harm to the incentives of the patent system is apparent.” Id. at 966.
222. See id. at 967 (“To conclude on the light Flook sheds on these cases, very simply, for the
reasons we have stated, we find none.”).
223. Id. at 973.
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2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
On July 27, 1979, the USPTO filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court in both Bergy and Chakrabarty. 224 The Solicitor
General, representing the government, stated that these cases presented an
issue of first impression for the Court—”[w]hether a living organism is
patentable subject matter under [§] 101.” 225 It contended that the claims
at issue here were not patent eligible, asserting that Congress did not
“intend[] to include living things within the scope of the general patent
laws.” 226 It further argued that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant
Variety Protection Act of 1970 further supported this conclusion because
“Congress evidently believe[s] that existing patent law did not extend to
living things, for if plants, as living things, were already patentable under
[§] 101.” 227
The memorandum from the cert pool clerk recommended denying
certiorari. 228 After summarizing the facts, procedural history, lower court
decision, and the parties’ arguments, the memorandum acknowledged that
the “issue presented is important” but concluded that it did not warrant the
attention of the Court at this time. 229 It contended that the CCPA’s
decision was “extremely thorough and carefully examines the issue in
light of Flook,” and argued that “in order to avoid further complicating
the already highly controversial policy problems surrounding genetic
engineering, it would seem preferable to examine such problems in a case
that actually present them rather than in a case, such as this one, which
can be construed as applying only to microorganisms.” 230 The
memorandum also noted the absence of a circuit split on this issue, and
asserted that “the conclusion reached by the court below is well-supported
and does not seem to be incorrect.” 231 In a handwritten note on the first
page of this memorandum, Justice Powell’s own law clerk disagreed with
this assessment, stating that “I would lean to grant. This is not the sort of

224. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978) (No. 79-136), 1979
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1200.
225. Id. at *3, *13.
226. Id. at *18.
227. Id.
228. See Supreme Court Case File, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136 (1979), at 6, in Lewis
F. Powell, Jr. Archive, Box 523/Folder 10–12 [hereinafter Chakrabarty Case File],
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles/648 [https://perma.cc/4X5F-3V6D].
229. Preliminary Memorandum, Parker v. Bergy (No. 79-136), at 5 (Oct. 26, 1979), in
Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 6.
230. Id. at 5–6.
231. Id.
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issue that can be left to sit if the Court ever wants to take it.” 232 Justice
Powell agreed with his clerk’s assessment, ultimately voting to grant
certiorari.
In a conference on October 26, 1979, Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
Powell, and White voted to grant the petition for certiorari in both Bergy
and Chakrabarty. 233 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Marshall,
Rehnquist, and Stevens voted to deny the petition. 234 The petition for
certiorari was formally granted on October 29, 1979, and the two cases
were consolidated into a single appeal. 235 However, Bergy abandoned the
patent application prior to oral argument, and the Justices unanimously
granted the petition to vacate the CCPA’s decision in Bergy and remand
it with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot, 236 leaving Chakrabarty’s
patent application as the sole case under consideration.
3. Merits Stage
In its briefing, the Solicitor General argued that absent clear
congressional intent to afford patent protection to living organisms, § 101
should not be interpreted to extend patent eligibility to living things,
including microorganisms. 237 The government also pointed to the Plant
Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Act of 1970 as evidence that
Congress did not intend for living organisms to be patent eligible.238 If
Congress considered living things to be covered by § 101, then it would
not have felt the need to enact separate legislation for a subset of living
organisms. 239 In addition, the government raised potential ethical, health,
and economic concerns regarding the patentability of living organisms,
and argued that “[t]he difficult policy questions raised by extension of
patent protection” of living organisms required the Court “to proceed with
great caution.” 240

232. Id. at 1 (handwritten note on bottom of page).
233. Certiorari Vote Tally Sheet, Parker v. Bergy (No. 79-136) (Oct. 26, 1979), in Chakrabarty
Case File, supra note 228, at 8.
234. Id.
235. Diamond v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 924, 924 (1979).
236. Memorandum, Motion of Bergy to Dismiss and Vacate as to Bergy, et al., Diamond v.
Bergy (No. 79-136) (Jan. 11, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 9; Vote Tally Sheet,
Motion to Dismiss and Vacate as to Bergy, Diamond v. Bergy (No. 79-136) (Jan. 11, 1980), in
Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 10.
237. Brief for Petitioner, Diamond v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 924 (1979) (No. 79-136), 1980 WL
339757, at *12.
238. Id. at *22–23.
239. Id. at *23.
240. Id. at *20–21.
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In response, Chakrabarty contended that the government’s position
would require the Court to reverse a long-standing policy of granting
patents involving living organisms. 241 Chakrabarty’s brief cited numerous
instances where the USPTO had previously granted patents which
included microorganisms as part of the claimed invention, 242 as well as
prior lower court decisions that upheld the validity of claims involving
living organisms. 243 In addition, Chakrabarty argued a man-made
bacterium like the one at issue here fell within the statutory categories of
“manufacture” and “composition of matter” under § 101. 244 Finally,
Chakrabarty contended that the legislative history of the Plant Patent Act
of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 “does not reveal[,]
either by expression or by implication, that the living nature of plants was
what placed them outside the scope of the patent law.” 245
In a bench memorandum prior to oral argument, Justice Powell’s law
clerk expressed uncertainty about the outcome, stating that “[f]or . . . the
first time this year, I have no firm view of a case. The questions involved
are large, complex, and center on matters that I have no background in:
biochemistry and patent law.” 246 After summarizing the claimed
invention, the procedural history, and the parties’ arguments, the
memorandum stated that “[t]here is no persuasive legislative history on
this dispute,” and neither sides’ arguments were “especially compelling
or silly.” 247 Ultimately, the memorandum contended that “Congress is the
proper forum for [this issue’s] resolution,” 248 and it proposed either
reversing the CCPA, which “could well result in legislative action,” or
remanding for review of the “product of nature” issue, which was not
addressed in the lower court’s most recent decision. 249
In handwritten notes on this bench memorandum, Justice Powell
stated that the “CCPA doesn’t like Flook, [and] wrote around it in holding
in Bergy . . . that a living organism may be patented. Patent law [was] not
written with modern science [and] technology in mind. Congress should

241. Brief for Respondent, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (No. 79-136), 1980
WL 339758, at *12.
242. Id. at *18–21, *50–52.
243. Id. at *15–16 (citing Penn. Res. Corp. v. Lescarboura Spawn Co., 29 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.
Pa. 1939); Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931)).
244. Brief for Respondent, supra note 241, at *37–42.
245. Id. at *42.
246. Bench Memorandum to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Diamond v. Chakrabarty (No. 79136), at 2 (Mar. 13, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 12.
247. Id. at 4–5.
248. Id. at 6.
249. Id. at 6–7.
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address the ‘living organism’ issue.” 250 Justice Powell also noted that his
clerk thinks—and “I agree—that Congress should clarify [the] patent
laws. One way to avoid an ‘up or down’ jud[icial] resolution of this issue
is to remand” the case to the CCPA. 251 In a separate handwritten note
dated March 19, 1980—two days after oral argument—Justice Powell
noted that he was “[i]nclined to [r]everse” because “[p]atent laws [were]
not written with [the] most recent science and technology in mind. [The]
[l]anguage of § 101 is broad enough—like [the] Sherman Act—to cover
almost anything . . . . But Congress has never considered the patentability
of . . . living organisms.” 252
At the post-argument conference on March 19, 1980, the Justices
voted 5–4 to affirm the CCPA, thus finding Chakrabarty’s claims to the
bacteria to be patentable subject matter under § 101. 253 Below are each
Justice’s votes on patent eligibility, 254 along with a summary of Justice
Powell’s notes from the conference:
Chief Justice (Burger): Patent eligible. The Chief Justice stated “[t]his
case falls within literal language of § 101—manufacture or composition
of matter.” He added that Chakrabarty has other hurdles, such as
obviousness, to receiving a patent. Furthermore, “Congress can reverse
any decision we make.”
Justice Brennan: Not patent eligible. Justice Brennan agreed with
government’s argument that Congress has not considered this issue, and
“[o]nly what Congress says is patentable may be patented.” While § 101
could include living organisms, “Congress has not been specific enough
to warrant going this far.”
Justice Stewart: Patent eligible. Justice Stewart contended that the
“language of [§] 101 does not exclude living organisms.” Further,
“Flook said we should proceed cautiously—but we can be cautious and
still affirm. For years [USPTO] has been going farther than this.”
Finally, he stated the “Plant Patent Act is irrelevant.”

250. Id. at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
251. Id.
252. Justice Powell’s Pre-Conference Handwritten Note, Diamond v. Chakrabarty (No. 79-136)
(Mar. 19, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 24.
253. Justice Powell’s Conference Notes, Diamond v. Chakrabarty (No. 79-136), at 1 (Mar. 19,
1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 25.
254. For Chakrabarty, a vote in favor of patent eligibility was a vote to affirm the CCPA, while
a vote against patent eligibility was a vote to reverse.
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Justice White: Not patent eligible. Stating this was an “[a]wfully close
case,” he tentatively agreed with Justice Brennan. Unlike Justice
Stewart, he believed that “[t]he Plant Patent Act is relevant.”
Justice Marshall: Not patent eligible. No further notes.
Justice Blackmun: Patent eligible. Justice Blackmun thought the Court
“should not say ‘life’ isn’t patentable.” Additionally, Flook “points
towards affirmance” of the CCPA’s decision.
Justice Powell: Not patent eligible. Justice Powell noted his vote was
“tentative.”
Justice Rehnquist: Patent eligible. Justice Rehnquist stated that
“Congress has addressed this question—as recently as 1952” and that
the language of § 101 is “broad enough to include” living organisms.
Justice Stevens: Patent eligible. Justice Stevens thought this was a
“difficult case.” He recognized the claimed invention was “a man made
living thing.” However, he voted to affirm the CCPA’s decision because
“Funk and other cases[] support patentab[ility].” Further, he believed the
language of § 101 could “cover this” as a “composition of matter.” 255

Chief Justice Burger circulated a first draft of the opinion on May 8,
1980, to the conference. 256 Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stewart, and
Stevens joined the opinion. 257
Justice Brennan circulated a first draft of the dissenting opinion on
May 28, 1980. 258 This was followed by join notices from Justices
Marshall and White on the same day. 259 In individual correspondence to

255. Justice Powell’s Conference Notes, Diamond v. Chakrabarty (No. 79-136), at 1–3 (Mar.
19, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 25–27.
256. First Draft, Opinion for the Court, Diamond v. Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) (circulated May
8, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 30–43.
257. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart to Chief Justice Warren Burger, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) (May 9, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 58;
Memorandum from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Chief Justice Warren Burger, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) (May 12, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 60;
Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Chief Justice Warren Burger, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) (May 12, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 61;
Memorandum from Justice John Paul Stevens to Chief Justice Warren Burger, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) (May 14, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 65.
258. First Draft, Dissenting Opinion by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Diamond v. Chakrabarty
(No. 79-136) (May 28, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 66–69.
259. Memorandum from Justice Byron R. White to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Diamond v.
Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) (May 28, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 70;
Memorandum from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Diamond v.
Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) (May 28, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 72.
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Justice Brennan on May 29, 1980, Justice Powell proposed the addition
of a final paragraph to the dissent, which would state:
The Court protests that its holding today is dictated by the broad
language of § 101, which “cannot be confined to the ‘particular
application[s] . . . contemplated by the legislators.’” Ante, at 12, quoting
Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90 (1945). But this decision does not
follow the unavoidable implications of the statute. Rather, it extends the
patent system to cover living material even though Congress plainly has
legislated in the belief that § 101 does not encompass living organisms.
It is the role of Congress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach
of the patent laws. This is especially true where, as here, the composition
sought to be patented uniquely implicates matters of public concern. 260

On June 2, 1980, Justice Brennan circulated a second draft of the
dissent that included Justice Powell’s proposed final paragraph. 261 Justice
Powell then sent a join notice for the dissent. 262 A third and final draft of
the dissent was circulated the following day. 263
4. Court’s Decision
The Court’s decision in Chakrabarty was issued on June 16, 1980.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger stated the issue in the case
was “whether a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” 264 After summarizing the claimed
invention and procedural history, the majority’s opinion framed the issue
as a “narrow one of statutory interpretation . . . . [s]pecifically, we must
determine whether [Chakrabarty]’s micro-organism constitutes a
‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ within the meaning of

260. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) (May 29, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at
74. All of this language, except for the final sentence (which was handwritten), appears to have been
drafted by one of Justice Powell’s law clerks. Bench Memorandum to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) (May 29, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at
73.
261. Second Draft, Dissenting Opinion by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Diamond v.
Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) (circulated June 2, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 76–
79.
262. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Diamond v. Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) (June 2, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at
75.
263. Third Draft, Dissenting Opinion by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Diamond v.
Chakrabarty (No. 79-136) (circulated June 3, 1980), in Chakrabarty Case File, supra note 228, at 80–
83.
264. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
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[§ 101].” 265 Relying on canons of statutory construction, the majority
construed “manufacture” and “composition of matter” broadly. 266 It
further asserted that “[t]he relevant legislative history supports a broad
construction,” citing language from the Committee Reports of the 1952
Patent Act that “Congress intended [patentable] subject matter to ‘include
anything under the sun that is made by man.’” 267
While recognizing that “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstracts ideas have been held not patentable,” citing Le Roy, Morse, Funk
Brothers, Benson, and Flook, the majority contended that Chakrabarty’s
“micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter. His claim
is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomena, but a nonnaturally
occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human
ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character, [and] use.’” 268 The
majority specifically distinguished Chakrabarty’s invention from the root
nodule bacteria claimed in Funk Brothers on the basis that the latter
involved only discovery of naturally-occurring phenomenon rather than
creating an entirely new type of bacteria through genetic engineering. 269
The majority’s opinion also responded to the government’s argument that
the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act
evinced an understanding by Congress that living organisms fell outside
the ambit of § 101, reasoning that “Congress . . . recognized that the
relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but
between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made
inventions.” 270 Finally, the opinion rejected the government’s argument
that the Court should not extend patent eligibility to microorganisms
unless and until Congress “expressly authorizes such protection,”
asserting that “Congress employed broad general language in § 101
precisely
because
[ground-breaking]
inventions
are
often
unforeseeable.” 271 It also dismissed the public policy concerns regarding
genetic engineering, asserting that such arguments should be directed
toward Congress and the Executive Branch.272
In dissent, Justice Brennan “agree[d] with the Court that the question
before us is a narrow one,” but disagreed with the outcome, asserting that
the 1930 Plant Patent Act “evidence[s] Congress’ understanding, at least
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 309–10 (citing Hartranft v. Weigmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)).
Id. at 310.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 315–16.
Id. at 316–17.
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since 1930, that § 101 does not include living organisms.” 273 In addition,
the dissent argued that the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act “clearly
indicates that Congress has included bacteria within the focus of its
legislative concern, but not within the scope of patent protection,” by
“specifically exclud[ing] bacteria from the coverage of [that] Act.”274
“Given the complexity and legislative nature of this delicate task, we must
be careful to extend patent protection no further than Congress has
provided.” 275 The dissent concluded with the final paragraph
recommended by Justice Powell, asserting that “[i]t is the role of
Congress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of the patent
laws.” 276
D.

Diamond v. Diehr
1. Facts and Procedural History

In 1975, James Diehr and Theodore Lutton (Diehr) filed a patent
application for an improved rubber curing process. 277 The claimed process
employed several mathematical formulas, including the well-known
Arrhenius equation, to repeatedly calculate the cure time for rubber
articles based on repeated measurements taken during the curing
process. 278 The result is precisely cured rubber with minimal over- or
under-processed waste product. 279
Initially, the patent examiner rejected Diehr’s claim as not patent
eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because “[t]he only non-conventional
claim steps ‘define[d] a computer program for taking repeated
temperature measurements from the mold and calculating cure time in
response to said measurement data.’” 280 The examiner interpreted the
Supreme Court’s decision in Flook to have “declined to extend patent
protection absent a considered action by Congress.” 281 The BPAI affirmed
the patent examiner’s rejection, similarly relying on Flook. 282 Further,
“[i]t dismissed appellants’ argument that no computer program was

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 318–20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 321–22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 983 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177–80 (1981).
In re Diehr, 602 F.2d at 983.
Id. at 984.
Id. (quoting the patent examiner).
Id.
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disclosed in the specification, citing an admission to the contrary made by
appellants during prosecution.” 283
Diehr appealed this decision to the CCPA, which found the claim to
be patent eligible and reversed the examiner’s rejection. 284 The CCPA
concluded that Diehr was not attempting to patent a mathematical formula
by itself, but rather an entire process for molding rubber articles, including
novel steps not used in prior art for rubber making. 285 The prior art in the
rubber making industry did not include the step of continuously measuring
and recalculating the curing of rubber inside the press so that the door can
be opened at exactly the proper time. 286 Furthermore, it held that the BPAI
improperly included “[n]ovelty considerations[, which] ha[d] no bearing
on whether claims define statutory subject matter under § 101.” 287 Finally,
it determined that granting the patent would not preclude others from
using the Arrhenius equation in other contexts. 288
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Following the CCPA’s decision, the USPTO filed petition for writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court. 289 The Solicitor General, acting on
behalf of the USPTO, contended that the lower court incorrectly decided
this case and urged the Court to grant certiorari. 290
A memorandum by the cert pool clerk recommended granting
certiorari. 291 After discussing the facts and procedural history, the
memorandum noted that the Solicitor General contended “this is the
second time in two months that the CCPA has refused to apply” Flook and
that this case is “indistinguishable” from Flook because “[t]he only new
element in [Respondents’] claim was the use of a computer to recalculate
cure time. Since the mathematical algorithm cannot be patented, the patent
application was properly denied.” 292 The pool clerk appeared to agree

283. Id.
284. Id. at 989.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 986.
289. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (No. 79-1112), 1980
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1851.
290. See Supreme Court Case File, Diamond v. Diehr, No. 79-1112 (1981), in Lewis F. Powell,
Jr.
Archive,
Box
534/Folder
15–18
[hereinafter
Diehr
Case
File]
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles/647 [https://perma.cc/NDG9-577M].
291. Preliminary Memorandum, Diamond v. Diehr (No. 79-1112), at 1–6 (Mar. 14, 1980), in
Diehr Case File, supra note 290, at 2–7.
292. Id. at 3–4.
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with the Solicitor General’s assessment, stating that “[t]he only distinction
I see between this case and Flook is that [Respondents] here, unlike . . . in
Flook, do not concede that all the elements of their invention other than
the formula are nonnovel.” 293 The pool clerk asserted that the CCPA erred
by “interpret[ing] Flook as not requiring segregation of the nonpatentable
algorithm and examination of the rest of the invention for novelty.” 294 As
a result, the clerk recommended granting the government’s petition and
consolidating Diehr with another pending case, Diamond v. Bradley, that
raised a similar issue, as the Solicitor General suggested. 295 In a
handwritten note on the memorandum, Justice Powell noted that the
CCPA “seems to have muffed this patent case (that I don’t understand)”
and that “I could be persuaded to grant.” 296
At a conference on March 14, 1980, Justices Blackmun, Powell,
Stevens, and White all voted to grant certiorari.297 Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist voted to deny the
petition. 298 Justice Stewart voted to join three. 299 Justice Powell noted that
all of the Justices voted in the same way here as in Diamond v. Bradley, a
case where the Solicitor General also urged the Court to grant certiorari
and consolidate with Diehr. 300 The Court issued an order grant certiorari
on March 17, 1980, 301 with briefing and oral arguments ultimately
scheduled for the following term.
3. Merits Stage
In its opening brief, the government argued that the claimed
invention was indistinguishable from Flook, and thus Diehr’s claims were
not patent eligible. 302 It asserted that “[i]n both cases, applicants seek to
patent a process[,] the only novel feature of which is an algorithm
embodied in a computer program.” 303 All of the steps in Flook’s claimed

293. Id. at 5.
294. Id. at 6.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
297. Certiorari Vote Tally Sheet, Diamond v. Diehr (No. 79-1112) (Mar. 14, 1980), in Diehr
Case File, supra note 290, at 8.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Diamond v. Diehr, 445 U.S. 926, 926 (1980).
302. See Brief for Petitioner, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (No. 79-1112), 1980 WL
339341, at *6 (“This case differs from Parker v. Flook in no significant way.” (internal citation
omitted)); see also id. at *7 (“This case is Flook revisited.”).
303. Id. at *6.
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process, except for “actually programming the computer to control the
already-known rubber molding process,” were already well known in the
field. 304 And the inclusion of post-solution activity—applying the
algorithm in a particular context—was insufficient to transform Flook’s
claims into patent eligible subject matter, it contended.305 Ultimately, the
government asserted that the CCPA’s decision should be reversed because
it improperly refused to apply Flook, giving it an unduly narrow reading
that “effectively confines Flook to its own facts.” 306
In response, Diehr first argued that the claimed invention was
chemical and mechanical in nature, rather than mathematical.307 The
inventors were not attempting to patent an algorithm; rather, they used an
algorithm in one of the steps in an industrial process to cure rubber. 308
Second, Diehr asserted the BPAI erred when it rejected the claims because
novelty of the steps should not be considered under § 101. 309 Third, Diehr
contended the BPAI should not have dissected the claim into novel and
non-novel elements when considering patent eligibility. 310 Instead, the
process should be assessed as a whole. 311 Diehr asserted that, unlike
Flook, the claimed invention included novel steps other than the use of
mathematical equations.312 Finally, Diehr argued that the step of
continuously measuring the internal temperature inside the mold is not
within the prior art and therefore is patentable.313
A bench memorandum prepared by one of Justice Powell’s law
clerks on October 11, 1980, noted the central role of Flook in resolving
the patent eligibility of Diehr’s claims. 314 After a detailed discussion of
Flook, including the dissenting opinion, and a summary of parties’
arguments, the memorandum focused on whether Flook was correctly
decided. The clerk stated that, in his view:
304. Id. at *8–10.
305. Id. at *12–13.
306. Id. at *10–12.
307. Brief for Respondent, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (No. 79-1112), 1980 WL
339342, at *4.
308. See id. (“Diehr . . . do[es] not attempt to patent an algorithm . . . .”); see also id. at *28
(“[T]here can be no doubt that Diehr . . . seek[s] to patent a process, not an algorithm for a
computer . . . .”).
the idea itself.
309. Id. at *14–15.
310. Id. at *39–43.
311. Id. at *46.
312. Id. at *42–46.
313. Id. at *10, *18, *35.
314. Bench Memorandum to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Diamond v. Diehr (No. 79-1112), at
1 (Oct. 11, 1980), in Diehr Case File supra note 290, at 9 (“This case is confusing. But its resolution
turns principally on an application of a single Supreme Court case, Parker v. Flook . . . .”).
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[T]here was much merit to Justice Stewart’s dissent in Flook. It seems
to me that novelty ought to be irrelevant to the § 101 inquiry. . . . The
inquiry under § 101 ought to be confined to examining whether the
subject matter of the process is patentable, assuming novelty . . . . Flook
involved the patentability of a process[,] the only novel element of
which was a computer program. I would have thought that his patent
should not have been denied as obvious under § 101, but rather under
§§ 102 and 103. My view, however, seems to have been rejected by the
Court (and by you) in Flook . . . .

...
Flook imported considerations of novelty and obviousness into the § 101
inquiry. Along with the three dissenters in that case, I think the Court—
if it meant what it said—was wrong. 315

The memorandum then discussed the impact of Flook at the USPTO and
lower courts, explaining that “the CCPA continues to treat [novelty and
nonobviousness] as irrelevant in the § 101 inquiry,” and noting:
The confusion that Flook has created in the patent office and the CCPA
is manifested by this case. The patent office found that [Diehr]’s process
was old because all of its aspects, including the placement of the
thermometer and system of immediate calculations, were old. The
CCPA treated novelty as irrelevant and reversed. 316

The memorandum concluded by recommending that either the Court
either clarify Flook and affirm the CCPA, or remand to give the CCPA an
opportunity to review the BPAI’s factual findings on novelty. 317
In handwritten notes on this bench memorandum, Justice Powell
agreed that Flook controlled here. 318 However, he further noted that the
question “is what [Flook] holds [and] is it right[?]” 319 At the top of the
first page, Justice Powell noted that the memorandum was “[p]ersuasive
that my vote in Flook was [in] error.” 320
During a conference on October 17, 1980, following oral arguments,
the Justices tentatively agreed to affirm the CCPA in a 5–4 vote, thus
finding that Diehr’s claim was patent eligible.321 Below are each Justice’s

315. Id. at 7–8.
316. Id. at 8–9.
317. Id. at 9.
318. Id. at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
319. Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
320. Id. (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
321. Justice Powell’s Conference Notes, Diamond v. Diehr (No. 79-1112), at 1 (Oct. 17, 1980),
in Diehr Case File, supra note 290, at 23.
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votes on patent eligibility, 322 along with a summary of Justice Powell’s
notes from the conference:
Chief Justice (Burger): Patent eligible. “Flook does not control” because
the “process claim” here involved “transforming uncured rubber into
seals to prevent oil leakage.” In contrast, “Flook dealt with a computer
program.” Diehr’s process “involves transformation of material into [a]
different state” and thus is “[m]uch more than some abstract principle.”
“We should not read § 101 narrowly. It is intended to encourage
innovation.”
Justice Brennan: Not patent eligible. “Flook can’t be distinguished.”
Justice Stewart: Patent eligible. Agreed with the Chief Justice.
Justice White: Patent eligible. Also agreed with the Chief Justice.
“Closer case than Bradley—but Flook doesn’t control.” Noted that the
Court “[d]o[es]n’t need to reach J[udge] Rich’s erroneous language.”
Justice Marshall: Not patent eligible. No further notes.
Justice Blackmun: Not patent eligible. A short but incomplete note
regarding Justice Blackmun’s views mentioned the “mere presence of a
computer process doesn’t” without further elaboration.
Justice Powell: Patent eligible. Justice Powell noted that he “agreed with
much of what [the Chief Justice] and [Justice White] said.” “The
claimed invention involves use of a computer to calculate temperatures
continuously in the process of molding rubber by heat . . . . Not a
machine, but [it] is a process or method involving computer [and]
programming. [Diehr’s] process has significant cost advantages. The
method of ‘continuous measuring’ is [the] only patentable feature.”
Justice Powell also noted that “[y]ears of experimentation & large
investment has gone into” Diehr’s invention. “Despite Flook, novelty
should be irrelevant under § 101.”
Justice Rehnquist: Patent eligible. Diehr claimed a “[n]ew and useful
invention.” Regarding patentable subject matter, “this is ‘exactly what
[p]atent [l]aw is about.’ Flook did not exclude all computer processes.”
Justice Stevens: Not patent eligible. He voted to “[r]everse or remand.”
“This is a prior art patent for 15 claims. Only claim 16 purports to be
new, and as to this the computer is used to do more efficiently. . . . [T]he

322. For Diehr, a vote in favor of patent eligibility was a vote to affirm the CCPA, while a vote
against patent eligibility was a vote to reverse the CCPA.
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[claimed] process is simply a faster way to do something that was not
new.” 323

Justice Rehnquist circulated a first draft of the majority opinion on
November 13, 1980. 324 In handwritten notes on the first page of his copy
of the draft, Justice Powell noted that the opinion distinguished both
Benson and Flook, and that “§ 102—not § 101—addresses ‘novelty,’”
which was “not decide[d]” here. 325 Justice Powell indicated that he would
“probably join” Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, which he ultimately did. The
final, published version of Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in
Diehr is identical to this first draft, except for a handful of apparently
stylistic changes.
4. Court’s Decision
The Court’s decision in Diehr was released on March 3, 1981. 326
After summarizing the claimed invention and procedural history, Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion for the majority began with a summary of the history
of § 101, including the definition of a patentable process. 327 It then quoted
a statement from Benson that “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article
‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process
claim that does not include particular machines,” and declared that “we
think that a physical and chemical process for molding synthetic rubber
products falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject
matter” because Diehr’s claims “involve the transformation of an article,
in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or
thing.” 328 The Court’s opinion emphasized the industrial nature of the
claimed process and the use of a tangible apparatus to practice it, including
the steps of “installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, . . . and
automatically opening the press at the proper time.” 329
The majority then attempted to distinguish Diehr’s claim invention
from both Benson and Flook, stating that “[o]ur conclusion . . . is not

323. Justice Powell’s Conference Notes, supra note 321, at 1–3, in Diehr Case File, supra note
290, at 23–25.
324. First Draft, Opinion for the Court, Diamond v. Diehr (No. 79-1112) (circulated Nov. 13,
1980), in Diehr Case File, supra note 290, at 27–43.
325. Id. at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
326. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 175 (1981).
327. Id. at 181–84.
328. Id. at 184 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
329. Id. at 187; see also id. at 192–93 (“Because we do not view respondents’ claims as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the
molding of rubber products, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.”).
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altered by the fact that in several steps of the process a mathematical
equation and programmed digital computer are used.” 330 It contended that
Benson and Flook stood for “no more than the[] long-established
principles” that “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,”
by themselves, are not patentable. 331 In contrast, Diehr
do[es] not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, [respondents]
seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their
process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but
they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek
only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with
all of the other steps in their claimed process. 332

Citing Le Roy, Morse, Mackay Radio, and Funk Brothers, the Court
contended that “an application of a law or nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.” 333 Here, “Arrhenius’ equation is not patentable in isolation,
but when a process for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a
more efficient solution of the equation, that process is at the very least not
barred at the threshold by § 101.” 334
Reflecting Justice Powell’s concerns about conflating patent
eligibility under § 101 with novelty under § 102, the Court’s opinion then
explained:
In determining the eligibility of [a] claimed process for patent protection
under § 101, [the] claims must be considered as a whole. It is
inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then
to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is
particularly true in a process claim because a new combination of steps
in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the
combination were well known and in common use before the
combination was made. The “novelty” of any element or steps in a
process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of
possibly patentable subject matter.
It has been urged that novelty is an appropriate consideration under
§ 101. . . . Section 101, however, is a general statement of the type of
subject matter that is eligible for patent protection “subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.” Specific conditions for
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Id. at 185.
Id.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 187–88.
Id. at 188.
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patentability follow and § 102 covers in detail the conditions relating to
novelty. The question therefore of whether a particular invention is
novel is “wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category
of statutory subject matter.” 335

The Court concluded by reiterating that Diehr’s invention was patent
eligible under § 101 because it was “a process for molding rubber
products and not . . . an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.” 336
The four dissenting Justices, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens
(who authored the majority opinion in Flook), contended that Diehr’s
process was indistinguishable from the process found ineligible in Flook:
A fair reading of the entire patent application, as well as the specific
claims, makes it perfectly clear that what Diehr . . . claim[s] to have
discovered is a method of using a digital computer to determine the
amount of time that a rubber molding press should remain closed during
the synthetic rubber-curing process. . . . What they claim to have
discovered, in essence, is a method of updating the original estimated
curing time by repetitively recalculating that time pursuant to a wellknown mathematical formula in response to variations in temperature
within the mold. Their method of updating the curing time calculation
is strikingly reminiscent of the method of updating alarm limits that Dale
Flook sought to patent.
...
The essence of the claimed discovery in both cases was an algorithm
that could be programmed on a digital computer. In Flook, the algorithm
made use of multiple process variables; in this case, it makes use of only
one. In Flook, the algorithm was expressed in a newly developed
mathematical formula; in this case, the algorithm makes use of a wellknown mathematical formula. Manifestly, neither of these differences
can explain today’s holding. 337

The dissent also criticized at length the CCPA’s patent eligibility
decisions after Benson and Flook, contending the lower court had
inappropriately given both cases a narrow reading. 338 Finally, it again
suggested that “[t]he broad question whether computer programs should
335. Id. at 188–190.
336. Id. at 191; see also id. at 192–93 (“Because we do not view respondents’ claims as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the
molding of rubber products, we affirm . . . .”).
337. Id. at 208–211 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 198–205 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 204 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that “Flook was not enthusiastically received by” the CCPA and that its “reading of Flook . . .
trivializes [its] holding”).
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be given patent protection involves policy considerations” better directed
to Congress than the courts. 339
E.

Diamond v. Bradley
1. Facts and Procedural History

On April 21, 1975, John J. Bradley and Benjamin S. Franklin
(Bradley), who were both employees of Honeywell, filed a patent
application for a “Switch System Base Mechanism.” 340 The claimed
invention covered a system for more efficiently managing the operation
of a digital computer in a multiprogram format, “in which the computer is
capable of executing more than one program, and thus perform more than
one application at the same time, without the need to reprogram the
computer for each task.” 341 According to the patent application, this is
achieved by storing certain information in scratchpad registers 342 located
in the computer’s central processing unit (CPU), rather than in main
memory, which significantly improves the computer’s speed of
operation. 343 One drawback of this approach, however, was that
information stored in the scratchpad register was difficult to change
because it could not be directly accessed by software, and thus was
effectively invisible to programmers. 344 Bradley’s invention overcame
this problem by storing system information in “firmware” 345 that controls
data transfers between the scratchpad registers and main memory. 346
The examiner rejected the claimed invention under Benson, on the
grounds that the invention was a “data structure” or algorithm designed to
control a multiprogrammed computer. 347 Following the Supreme Court’s
339. Id. at 216–17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
340. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 808 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
341. Id.
342. A scratchpad register is “a plurality of multibit storage locations, usually located in the
central processing unit (CPU) of a computer, used for temporary storage of program information,
operands, and calculation results for use by the computer’s arithmetic and logic unit, and other
information of a temporary nature.” Id. at 808 n.1.
343. Id. at 808.
344. Id.
345. Firmware is software that is programmed into non-volatile memory chips or devices,
meaning that it is not deleted when power to a device is turned off, unlike random-access memory.
See Jacqueline Emigh, RAM vs. ROM Differences, ENTERPRISE STORAGE FORUM (July 19, 2019),
https://www.enterprisestorageforum.com/storage-hardware/ram-vs-rom.html
[https://perma.cc/QRD8-8WYQ].
346. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d at 808–09; see also U.S. Patent No. 4,351,024 (issued Sept. 21,
1982) (further describing the claimed invention).
347. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d at 809–10.
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decision in Flook, the BPAI affirmed, concluding that the only novel part
of the claimed invention resided in the programming, which was directed
to a method of calculation or an algorithm. 348 It reasoned that “a claim for
an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a specific end use,
is unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 [and] Flook.” 349
On appeal, the CCPA unanimously reversed, holding that the
claimed invention was a patent-eligible machine or apparatus. 350 In an
opinion by Judge Rich, the CCPA contended that the “structural hardware
elements” in the claimed invention, “such as registers, portions of main
memory, and . . . other computer components,” fall within the literal
scope of § 101. 351 In other words, the invention “claim[s] a combination
of hardware elements, one of which happens to be a portion of the
computer’s control store microprogrammed in a particular manner,” and
“the particular information acted upon by [the] invention is irrelevant.” 352
The court found Benson and Flook distinguishable, as Bradley’s invention
did not preempt use of an algorithm, nor did it solve a specific
mathematical equation. 353
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
On December 3, 1979, the USPTO filed a petition for writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court. 354 In its petition, the USPTO argued that
the CCPA’s decision was “squarely at odds with Flook” because
“Bradley’s claim, however artfully described, seeks a patent on an
algorithm, for everything else in his claim is old and not . . . inventive.” 355
In response, Bradley argued that Flook was not applicable because the
claimed invention “comprises a computer hardware machine . . .
including a firmware element,” and “no algorithm is claimed.” 356

348. Id. at 810–11.
349. Id. at 811.
350. Id. at 812.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 813.
354. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981) (No. 79-855),
1979 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1363.
355. Id. at *11; see also id. at *13 (“Bradley’s program . . . is no more patentable than the
algorithms involved in Benson and Flook. Like programs generally, Bradley’s program is a set of
directions to the computer. It commands the switching of data, of whatever type, untied to any
particular end use.”).
356. Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari, Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981) (No.
79-855), 1980 WL 339233, at *11, *19.
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A memorandum circulated by the cert pool clerk recommended
granted certiorari. 357 After summarizing the facts, the procedural history,
and the parties’ arguments, the memorandum contended that “[a]ssuming
that the directions on the firmware are unpatentable, . . . Flook seems to
require rejection of the application under [§] 101, if the rest of the claimed
invention is old in the art.” 358 After raising and quickly dismissing two
other options—holding Bradley and Diehr for Chakrabarty (which was
pending) or summarily reversing the CCPA (as an “indication . . . that
insubordination will not be tolerated”)—the memorandum argued that
granting certiorari was the “best solution” because “[t]he CCPA has gone
far out on a limb in expressing its view that the Court did not anticipate
the consequences of Flook,” and “[s]uch strong statements of
disagreement from a court with some expertise in the area probably merit
full plenary consideration.” 359 In a handwritten note on the first page of
the memorandum, Justice Powell’s own law clerk appeared to agree with
this assessment, stating: “I would grant. The CCPA is purposefully
disregarding Flook.” 360 Justice Powell’s own handwritten note on the
memorandum noted that “[Solicitor General] says [CCPA] failed to
follow Parker v. Flook” and that he would vote to grant certiorari.361
In a conference on March 14, 1980, Justices Blackmun, Powell,
Stevens, and White voted to grant certiorari. 362 Justice Stewart voted to
“join three,” while Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Rehnquist voted to deny certiorari. 363 The Supreme Court formally
granted the petition for certiorari on March 17, 1980, and ordered the case
to be set for oral argument in tandem with Diehr. 364

357. Supreme Court Case File, Diamond v. Bradley, No. 79-855 (1981), in Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archive,
Box
531/Folder
8
[hereinafter
Bradley
Case
File],
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles/646/ [https://perma.cc/ PB2A-KVUK].
358. Preliminary Memorandum, Diamond v. Bradley (No. 79-855), at 7 (Feb. 27, 1980), in
Bradley Case File, supra note 357, at 8.
359. Id. at 8.
360. Id. at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Powell’s law clerk).
361. Id. (handwritten note of Justice Powell).
362. Certiorari Vote Tally Sheet, Diamond v. Bradley (No. 79-855) (Mar. 14, 1980), in Bradley
Case File, supra note 357, at 10.
363. Id.
364. Diamond v. Bradley, 445 U.S. 926, 926 (1980).
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3. Merits Stage
In its briefing, the government argued that under Benson and Flook,
“traditional computer programs—i.e., software—are unpatentable.” 365
Citing Stephen Breyer’s now-famous article on the copyrightability of
software, 366 it contended that every algorithm implemented by a computer
is the expression of a fundamental idea, and permitting the patenting of a
computer program would be akin to permitting a patent on the idea
itself. 367 The fact that Bradley’s invention stored the program “in
firmware rather than traditional software is of no legal significance,” it
asserted, because “[t]he algorithm is no less abstract when being claimed
as part of firmware.” 368 Second, the government argued that under Flook,
the claimed invention is not patentable because, after stripping the
unpatentable program, all of the remaining hardware components were
old, according to both the examiner and the BPAI. 369
In response, Bradley argued that the claimed invention is a machine,
rather than a computer program or algorithm, and thus is patentable
subject matter under § 101. 370 Bradley contended that the claimed
invention “is one of a series of inventions which collectively define an
entirely new computer machine which is now being commercially
marketed worldwide,” and the specific invention at issue is a machine
under § 101 because it consists of a variety of hardware, including
“register elements, hardware gates, logic circuits, and memory elements,”
that are “permanently incorporated into . . . the computer” and improve its
efficiency. 371 Respondent argued the USPTO erred in contending that the
invention was merely an unpatentable algorithm or method of calculation,
and in fact the patent application does not claim any particular
algorithm. 372 Furthermore, Bradley contended the USPTO was effectively
denying patent protection for any computer-related invention, which is
contrary to Benson and Flook. 373 Finally, Bradley asserted that the

365. Brief for Petitioner, Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981) (No. 79-855), 1980 WL
339235, at *12.
366. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 341–42 (1970).
367. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 365, at *12–14.
368. Id. at *19.
369. Id. at *20–22.
370. Brief for Respondents, Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981) (No. 79-855), 1980 WL
339238, at *2–5.
371. Id. at *1–2.
372. Id. at *6–8.
373. Id. at *22–32.
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USPTO improperly imported novelty and nonobviousness issues into the
§ 101 analysis. 374
In a bench memorandum, one of Justice Powell’s law clerks
concluded that “[a]lthough this case and Diehr involve different
fact[s] . . . the cases are very similar” because “they each have elements
apart from the computer that, when applied, perform useful functions.” 375
The clerk recommended that this case reach the same outcome as Diehr
and “clarify Flook and explain that novelty is irrelevant under § 101.” 376
In a handwritten note on the first page of this memorandum, Justice
Powell noted that this is “a close [and] difficult [question] whether [the]
CCPA has misapplied Flook.” 377 In addition, in a separate handwritten
note before conference, Justice Powell noted that “[t]here is troublesome
language in Flook suggesting that § 101 is concerned both with
patentability and novelty . . . [b]ut [the] structure of [the Patent] Act
indicates these are separate issues.” 378
During a conference on October 17, 1980, after oral argument, the
Justices initially voted to affirm 5–3, but Justice Brennan subsequently
switched his position, ultimately resulting in a 4–4 tie. 379 Chief Justice
Burger recused himself from the case. 380 Below are each Justice’s votes
on patent eligibility, 381 along with a summary of Justice Powell’s notes
from the conference:
Chief Justice Burger: Recused.
Justice Brennan: Not patent eligible. Initial vote to “[a]ffirm
tentatively.” “Await [Justice Stevens]’s views, but [he] thinks Flook is
distinguishable” because the “[i]nvention here is a machine.” “After
further consideration, [Justice Brennan] voted to reverse.”

374. Id. at *32.
375. Bench Memorandum to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Diamond v. Bradley (No. 79-855), at
5–6 (Oct. 11, 1980), in Bradley Case File, supra note 357, at 15–16.
376. Id. at 6.
377. Id. at 1 (handwritten notes of Justice Powell).
378. Justice Powell’s Pre-Conference Handwritten Note, Diamond v. Bradley (No. 79-855), in
Bradley Case File, supra note 357, at 20.
379. Justice Powell’s Conference Notes, Diamond v. Bradley (No. 79-855), at 1–3 (Oct. 17,
1980), in Bradley Case File, supra note 357, at 21–23. The handwritten notes at the top of Justice
Powell’s notes on this conference state “Affirm 5–3,” which is then crossed out, and “Affirmed 4–4”
is written immediately below, with a note that “WJB [Justice Brennan] changed vote.” Id. at 1.
380. Id. at 1. The reason for Chief Justice Burger’s recusal in Bradley are not clear from Justice
Powell’s records—his notes on the conference simply mention that the Chief Justice was “out.” Id.
381. For Bradley, a vote in favor of patent eligibility was a vote to affirm the CCPA, while a
vote against patent eligibility was a vote to reverse.
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Justice Stewart: Patent eligible. “[Government]’s view of Flook is far
too broad. It is that whenever an invention involves computer
programming, it is not patentable. Too extreme. Novelty issue not here.”
Justice White: Patent eligible. “Untenable to say can’t patent anything
if a computer program is involved. J[udge] Rich misinterpreted Flook—
but we don’t need to decide [the] case on this basis. We certainly have
not said all computer programs are unpatentable.”
Justice Marshall: Not patent eligible. “Flook controls. It means what it
says.”
Justice Blackmun: Not patent eligible. “The original claims didn’t
embrace a machine, and amend[ed] claims didn’t change this. This is a
computer program.” He also stated that “Flook should not be
reconsidered.”
Justice Powell: Patent eligible. “I am respectful of the expertise of [the]
CCPA—an expertise I do not have. Thus, if five other Justices think we
can fairly distinguish Flook—as I think we can—I’ll affirm. My own
inexpert judgment is that this is different from Flook. Here this is a
machine according to claims accepted, and patent is narrowly limited.”
Justice Rehnquist: Patent eligible. This is a “[s]tatutory area—stare
decisis usually applies. Problem is in [Benson]. Decision in Flook is in
accord with that case.” He also noted that “an ‘algorithm is a ‘problem,’”
and “[a]n answer or solution should be patentable.”
Justice Stevens: Not patent eligible. He voted to “[r]everse or [r]emand.”
This is a “[d]ifficult case to understand. J[udge] Rich at CCPA has
misapplied Flook. . . . In Flook, a non-patentable principle can’t be the
sole basis of what is claimed as an invention. Should remand for CCPA
to reconsider (again) in light of Flook.” 382

4. Resolution
Following the tied vote at conference, the Court issued a short per
curiam order on March 9, 1981, stating that the CCPA’s judgment was
affirmed by an equally divided Court, and that Chief Justice Burger took
no part in considering or deciding the Bradley case. 383 As a result, the
Court’s decision lacked precedential value.384

382. Id. at 1–3.
383. Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381, 381 (1981) (per curiam).
384. “[A]n affirmance by an equally divided Court is not entitled to precedential weight.” Ark.
Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 n.7 (1987) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
192 (1972)); see also Justin Pidot, Tie Votes in the Supreme Court, 101 MINN. L. REV. 245, 252
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IV. 1982 AND BEYOND: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
BURGER COURT’S PATENT ELIGIBILITY DECISIONS
This Part summarizes the development of the law regarding patent
eligibility since the Burger Court’s decisions. It begins with the Federal
Circuit, which stepped into the gap after Diehr and significantly
broadened patent eligibility in a series of decisions. 385 It then addresses
the Supreme Court’s return to the issue of patent eligibility and its heavy
reliance on the Burger Court decisions to find patents on methods of
financial transactions and genetic information ineligible. Finally, it
summarizes lower court citations to the Burger Court’s patent eligibility
decisions as another measure of their continuing impact in current patent
eligibility jurisprudence.
A.

The Federal Circuit Takes Charge

As the Supreme Court retreated from the issue of patent eligibility
after Diehr for over 25 years, the Federal Circuit stepped in to fill the void.
Created in 1982 in the wake of longstanding complaints that the regional
circuits reached inconsistent outcomes and were often hostile to patentees,
Congress intended the Federal Circuit to “insure[] a more uniform
interpretation of the patent laws and thus contribut[e] meaningfully and
positively to predicting the strength of patents.” 386 The Federal Circuit is
the successor to the CCPA, and upon its enactment, all of the judges on
the CCPA court became judges on the new Federal Circuit.387
Following Flook and Diehr, the CCPA articulated a two-part test
regarding the patenting of inventions that included an algorithm known as
the Freeman–Walter–Abele test. 388 As subsequently explained by the
Federal Circuit:
(2016) (“The Supreme Court has long applied the rule that where the Justices reach a tie vote on the
judgment in a case, the lower court’s opinion is affirmed. Such a decision binds the parties, but has
no precedential value.”).
385. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
386. Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. Seaman, Patent Injunctions on Appeal: An Empirical
Study of the Federal Circuit’s Application of eBay, 92 WASH. L. REV. 145, 165 (2017) (quoting
Hearings on H.R. 6033, H.R. 6934, H.R. 3806, and H.R. 2414, Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 797 (1980),
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/gdoc/hearings/8/81602054/81602054_5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PGA5-JUVL]; see also Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 551–73 (2003) (describing the creation and
purpose of the Federal Circuit).
387. Seamon, supra note 386, at 570.
388. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 765–68
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 905–07 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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It is first determined whether a mathematical algorithm is recited
directly or indirectly in the claim. If so, it is next determined whether
the claimed invention as a whole is no more than the algorithm itself;
that is, whether the claim is directed to a mathematical algorithm that is
not applied to or limited by physical elements or process steps. Such
claims are nonstatutory. However, when the mathematical algorithm is
applied to one or more elements of an otherwise statutory process
claim, . . . the requirements of section 101 are met. 389

In one of its first acts, the Federal Circuit adopted the CCPA’s decisions
as binding precedent. 390 The Federal Circuit continued to periodically
employ the Freeman–Walter–Abele test 391 until it was criticized in State
Street Bank 392 and ultimately rejected by the en banc decision in In re
Bilski. 393
In 1994, the Federal Circuit further broadened the patenting of
computer software in In re Alappat, holding that an apparatus that used
mathematical calculations to help render smooth and continuous lines on
an display screen was patentable subject matter. 394 It reasoned that under
Diehr, patent protection was barred when “the claimed subject matter as
a whole is a disembodied mathematical concept.” 395 If the claim included
“a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result,” it
could be patent eligible. 396 The following year, the USPTO issued
examination guidelines that effectively made any computer software
patentable, so long as it was embodied in a storage medium. 397

389. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
390. S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
391. See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d at 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Arrythmia Research Tech., Inc.
v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
392. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
(“After Diehr and Chakrabarty, the Freeman–Walter–Abele test has little, if any, applicability to
determining the presence of statutory subject matter.”).
393. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
394. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543–44 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
395. Id. at 1544 (emphasis removed).
396. Id.; see also id. at 1545 (“We have held that [software] programming creates a new
machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it
is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software. . . .
Consequently, a computer operating pursuant to software may represent patentable subject matter,
provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter meets all the other requirements of Title 35.”).
397. See John R. Thomas, Patenting the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1154–55
(1999); Robert Greene Sterne & Lawrence B. Bugaisky, The Expansion of Statutory Subject Matter
Under the 1952 Patent Act, 37 AKRON L. REV. 217, 223 (2004) (explaining that court decisions and
USPTO guidance “opened the doorway to patentability so wide that inventors can now, in effect,
patent any computer software provided that it is embodied in a medium such as a diskette”).
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In 1999, the Federal Circuit held in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc. that methods of doing business were
eligible for patent protection. 398 The claimed invention in State Street was
a data processing system for implementing a hub and spoke investment
structure, where mutual funds (spokes) pooled their assets in a portfolio
(hub), which offered efficiency and tax advantages. 399 This patent was
found invalid by the district court as an ineligible mathematical algorithm
in light of Benson and the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.400 As an alternative
ground, the district court also invalidated the patent-in-suit as an
unpatentable business method. 401 On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit
reversed on both issues. First, it held the transformation of data by a
machine constitutes a practical application of an algorithm because it
produces a “useful, concrete, and tangible result.” 402 Second, it rejected
the “so-called ‘business method’ exception to [patentable] subject
matter,” holding that “[s]ince the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have
been . . . subject to the same legal requirements of patentability as any
other process or method.” 403 These decisions helped open the floodgates
to the patenting of computer-related inventions. 404 Ultimately, the USPTO
issued thousands of patents for computer software, including data
structures, methods for performing calculations, data compression
algorithms, and software-based encryption. 405
Regarding biotechnology, the lower courts and the USPTO adhered
to an expansive view of patent eligibility following Chakrabarty. In 1987,
the BPAI overturned the examiner’s rejection of a patent application for a
genetically-modified oyster under § 101, 406 which the Federal Circuit
allowed to stand. 407 The following year, the USPTO granted a patent on
the first transgenic animal, the “Harvard Mouse,” 408 which is widely used

398. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
399. Id. at 1370.
400. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 927 F. Supp. 502, 508–14 (D. Mass. 1996).
401. Id. at 514–17.
402. State St., 149 F.3d at 1375.
403. Id.
404. See Osenga, supra note 25, at 1089–90; Thomas, supra note 397, at 1153.
405. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (2001).
406. Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1426 (BPAI 1987) (holding that the claimed polyploid
oysters were patent eligible under § 101 and Chakrabarty because they were “non-naturally occurring
manufactures or compositions of matter,” but affirming the examiner’s rejection of the claims as
obvious under § 103).
407. In re Allen, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Court’s unpublished opinion in Allen
focused on the nonobviousness issue.
408. Transgenic Non-human Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988).
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in clinical trials for cancer research. This was followed by patents on other
transgenic animals, including chickens, cows, dogs, and monkeys. 409 In
addition, the USPTO granted patents on genetically-modified crops 410 and
embryonic stem cells. 411 Ultimately, thousands of biotechnology patents
were granted each year during the 1990s. 412
In sum, the Federal Circuit’s decisions in the 1980s and 1990s
seemingly eviscerated any meaningful limits on patent eligibility. 413 The
broad conception of patent eligibility adopted by the Court in Chakrabarty
and Diehr had apparently won out, and the USPTO rarely denied patents
on grounds that they were drawn to ineligible subject matter. 414
B.

The Supreme Court Returns to the Bar of Patent Eligibility

Yet even as patent eligibility reached its high-water mark in the late
1990s and early 2000s, the tide begun started to shift, led by the Supreme
Court. Consistent with its increased engagement with patent law more
generally, 415 in 2006, several members of the Court expressed an interest
in re-examining the scope of patentable subject matter in Laboratory
Corp. of America v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. 416 The Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari in LabCorp on the issue of whether the claimed
method—which detected a deficiency of certain vitamins in warm409. See, e.g., Avian Embryonic Stem Cells, U.S. Patent No. 5,656,479 (issued Aug. 12, 1997)
(chicken); Transgenic Non-human Mammal Milk Comprising 2’-fucosyl-lactose, U.S. Patent No.
5,750,176 (issued May 12, 1998) (cow); Chimeric Protein that has a Human Rho Motif and
Deoxyribonuclease Activity, U.S. Patent No. 5,489,524 (issued Feb. 6, 1996) (monkey).
410. See, e.g., Estrification Process of Fats and Oils and Ezymatic Prepartion to Use Therein,
U.S. Patent No. 4,940,845 (issued Jul. 10, 1990); Glyphosphate-resistant Plants, U.S. Patent No.
5,188,642 (issued Feb. 23, 1993) (crops).
411. See, e.g., Primate Embryonic Stem Cells, U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (issued Mar. 13,
2001).
412. See Robinson & Medlock, supra note 30, at 13.
413. One widely-cited article succinctly summarized this with its title, “Everything is
Patentable.” See Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008).
414. One of the few exceptions is In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007), where the
examiner rejected a claim for including “watermarks” into digital audio files. This outcome was
upheld on appeal by the Federal Circuit, which found in a 2–1 decision that the claimed invention did
not fit into any of the statutory categories for patent eligibility in § 101. Id. at 1348.
415. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 283 (explaining that although the Court had decided very few patent
cases in the second half of the twentieth century, the Court’s increased number of patent cases since
then reflected that it was “increasingly comfortable in reviewing patent decisions and increasingly
interested in directing the development of the law in the field”); see generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, The
Supreme Court Bar at the Bar of Patents, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1233 (2020) (examining the
Supreme Court’s increased involvement in patent case and potential drivers of that trend).
416. Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125–39 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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blooded animals using an assay of bodily fluid for an elevated level of
total homocysteine, and correlating that elevated level with the amount of
vitamin deficiency—was patent eligible because it was drawn to a “basic
scientific relationship in used in medical treatment such that any doctor
necessarily infringes merely by thinking about the relationship after
looking at a test result,” 417 but it later dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted, apparently due to a procedural flaw that the patentable subject
matter issue had not been adequately raised and analyzed by the lower
courts. 418 In a lengthy dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens
and Souter, argued that the patent eligibility issue was important and
should be decided. 419 Citing Benson, Flook, and Diehr, Justice Breyer
asserted that the patent merely claimed a “natural phenomenon” because
it “amount[ed] to a simple natural correlation” between the measured
value of an amino acid and the amount of vitamin deficiency. 420 Justice
Breyer then raised various policy concerns about patent rights for medical
diagnostic and treatment methods more generally, including the financial,
transactional, and social costs of such patents. 421
Between 2010 and 2014, the Court decided four major patent
eligibility decisions, starting with Bilski v. Kappos 422 and culminating
with Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank. 423 Much ink has already has spilled in the
scholarly literature on these decisions and their ramifications,424 so this
417. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S.
124 (2006) (No. 04-607), 2004 WL 2505526; Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S.
999, 999 (2005) (granting certiorari on question 3 of the petition).
418. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 125.
419. Id. at 125–39 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
420. Id. at 135–37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
421. Id. at 132–34, 138–39 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
422. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
423. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
424. See generally J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Restrictions, 17
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 267 (2015); Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 82 (2012); Tun-Jen Chiang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1858 (2014); Andrew Chin, Ghost in the “New Machine”: How Alice Exposed
Software Patenting’s Category Mistake, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 623 (2015); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss &
James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic
Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349 (2011); John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 1247 (2011); Eisenberg, supra note 15; Robin Feldman, Whose Body Is It Anyway? Human
Cells and the Strange Effects of Property and Intellectual Property Law, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1377
(2011); Golden, supra note 2; Holman, supra note 15; Lefstin, supra note 18; Mark A. Lemley et al.,
Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011); Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold
Into Lead: How Patent Eligibility Doctrine is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 939 (2017); Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No
Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return
Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289 (2011); Osenga, supra note 18; Joshua
D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (2011);
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Article will not duplicate this work by recounting each case in full. But it
will briefly discuss how the Court applied and/or relied upon Burger Court
precedents to reach its decisions.
Bilski involved a patent application claiming a method of hedging
against risk through a series of transactions involving commodities. 425 The
examiner rejected the application because it “merely manipulates [an]
abstract idea” that was “not implemented on a specific apparatus,” and the
BPAI affirmed. 426 Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit overruled its
“useful, concrete, and tangible result” test in State Street, instead holding
that a claimed process was patent eligible if “(1) it is tied to a particular
machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a
different state or thing.” 427 The Federal Circuit majority’s opinion
extensively discussed and relied on Benson, Flook, and especially Diehr,
in adopting the machine-or-transformation test for patent eligibility. 428
The Supreme Court unanimously held Bilski’s claimed method was not
patentable subject matter. 429 Citing Benson, Flook, Chakrabarty, and
Diehr, the majority held that the Federal Circuit’s machine-ortransformation test was an “important and useful clue” regarding patent
eligibility, but it was not the “exclusive test.” 430 Ultimately, the Court
resolved Bilski “narrowly on the basis of this Court’s decisions in Benson,
Flook, and Diehr, which show that [Bilski’s] claims are not patentable
processes because they are attempts to patent abstract ideas.” 431 Bilski’s
impact was limited, however, because no majority emerged to outright
prohibit business method patents, as Justice Stevens advocated, 432 or to
adopt a clear alternative to the machine-or-transformation test. 433
In 2002, the Court unanimously held in Mayo Collaborative Services
v. Prometheus Laboratories that a patent claiming a method for the use of
Sherkow, supra note 2; Taylor, supra note 61; Rachel E. Sachs, Note, Diagnostic Method Patents
and Harms to Follow-On Innovation, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1370 (2013).
425. See Bilski, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010) (quoting Claim 1).
426. Id. at 599–600.
427. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
428. Id. at 950–58.
429. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 613.
430. Id. at 602–04.
431. Id. at 609.
432. See id. at 613–57 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
433. Id. at 612–13. However, five Justices rejected State Street Bank’s “useful, concrete, and
tangible result” test for patent eligibility. See id. at 644–48 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 659–60 (Breyer & Scalia, JJ., concurring in the judgment); see also Dennis Crouch, Bilski v.
Kappos and the Anti-State Street Majority, PATENTLY-O (June 28, 2010),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/06/bilski-v-kappos-and-the-anti-state-street-majority.html
[https://perma.cc/X4YE-5RAL] (“Although not rejected by the majority opinion, it is clear that the
broad ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result’ test is dead.”).
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thiopurine drugs in the treatment of autoimmune diseases was not
patentable subject matter. 434 The claimed process involved administering
a drug, subsequently determining the level of metabolized drug in a
patient’s body, and then indicating whether the amount of the drug given
needed to be increased or decreased in subsequent administrations. 435 The
district court held the patent invalid because it effectively claimed a
natural law or physical phenomena—“the correlations between thiopurine
metabolism levels and the toxicity and efficacy of thiopurine drug
dosages” 436—but the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the claimed
steps satisfied the machine-or-transformation test because it involved
transformation of the human body or blood taken from the body. 437 The
Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with the district court that the claimed
process was nothing more than an attempt to claim a law of nature. 438 The
addition of “well understood, routine, conventional activity” as part of the
claims, such as administering a drug and drawing blood from a patient,
were insufficient to “transform unpatentable natural correlations into
patentable applications.” 439 Part II of the Court’s opinion then discussed
Flook and Diehr at length, ultimately concluding that “[t]he claim before
us presents a case for patentability that is weaker than the (patent-eligible)
claim in Diehr and no stronger than the (unpatentable) claim in Flook.” 440
The Court also relied on Benson, asserting that, as in that case, simply
implementing an unpatentable claim using a machine “was not a
patentable application of that principle.” 441
The following year, the Court held in Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. that isolated, naturally occurring DNA
is not patentable subject matter, but synthetically-created DNA known as
complementary DNA (cDNA) was patent eligible.442 Myriad owned
several patents related to the location and sequence of the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes, which were highly correlated with a marked increase in
breast and ovarian cancer in women. 443 After invalidity challengers
434. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012).
435. Id. at 74–75.
436. Id. at 76.
437. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1345–47 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
438. Id. at 77–80.
439. Id. at 80.
440. Id. at 80–82.
441. Id. at 84–85.
442. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013).
443. Id. at 582–83; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (issued May 5, 1998) (BRCA1); U.S.
Patent No. 5,837,492 (issued Nov. 17, 1998) (BRCA2); U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (issued Dec. 2,
1997) (BCRA1); U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (issued Jan. 20, 1998) (BCRA1); U.S. Patent No.
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prevailed at the district court, the Federal Circuit reversed, relying heavily
on Chakrabarty to conclude that Myriad’s claimed DNA sequences were
patent eligible because they had been isolated from a larger DNA segment
through human intervention and therefore were patentable.444 After a
remand from the Court in light of Mayo, 445 the Federal Circuit again held
both isolated natural DNA and cDNA were patent eligible. 446 The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed on the former issue, holding that
naturally occurring DNA sequences, even if isolated, were a product of
nature and thus not patentable. 447 The Court noted that “Chakrabarty is
central to this inquiry,” and reasoned that this case was distinguishable
because, unlike Dr. Chakrabarty’s genetically-modified bacteria, “Myriad
did not create anything. To be sure, it found a useful and important gene,
but separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act
of invention.” 448
Finally, in 2014, the Court held in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International that patent claims for a computer-implemented method for
mitigating settlement risk by using a third-party intermediary were not
patent eligible. 449 The district court held that the relevant claims were
ineligible “because they are directed to the abstract idea of ‘employing of
a neutral intermediary to facilitate simultaneous exchange of obligations
in order to minimize risk.’” 450 A highly fractured Federal Circuit, sitting
en banc, affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion, with seven
separate opinions spanning 135 pages. 451 The Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed, holding that the claims “are drawn to the abstract
idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic
computer implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention.” 452 In an opinion written by Justice Thomas, the
Court articulated a two-step framework for evaluating whether an
invention is ineligible for patenting. The first step is assessing “whether
the claims at issue are directed to one of th[e] patent-ineligible
concepts”—“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” 453 If
5,710,001 (issued Jan. 20, 1998) (BCRA1); U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (issued May 19, 1998)
(BCRA1); U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (issued Mar. 7, 2000) (BCRA2).
444. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1350–55 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
445. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 568 U.S. 1045, 1045 (2012).
446. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
447. Myriad, 569 U.S. at 579.
448. Id. at 590–91.
449. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014).
450. Id. at 214 (quoting CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 252 (D.D.C. 2011)).
451. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
452. Alice, 573 U.S. at 212.
453. Id. at 217.
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so, the second step is to “consider the elements of each claim both
individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the
additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patenteligible application”—that is, whether there is “an ‘inventive concept’”
that “amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.” 454 Applying this test, the Court held that under the first
step, the claimed method was drawn to “the abstract idea of intermediated
settlement.” 455 It cited Benson and Flook, as well as Bilski, in support of
this conclusion. 456 For step two, the Court held that “[t]he introduction of
a computer into the claims” was insufficient to render it eligible. 457 The
Court again relied on both Benson and Flook, as well as Diehr, in
support. 458
C.

Lower Court Citations

Another measure of the continuing impact of the Burger Court’s
patent eligibility decisions are lower federal court citations to these cases.
To examine this, we used the “Citing References” feature in WestlawNext
to identify court decisions that cited Benson, Flook, Chakrabarty and
Diehr. 459 We limited the results to federal circuit and district court cases
between 1980 and 2019. Figure 1 below depicts a graphic representation
of the number of citations to each of these cases, grouped into five-year
intervals.

454. Id. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
72 (2012)).
455. Id. at 218.
456. Id. at 218–20.
457. Id. at 222.
458. Id. at 222–25.
459. Bradley was omitted from the search results, as only six federal court cases have cited it
since 1980, according to WestlawNext.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/4

64

Seaman and Wang: Patent Eligibility Jurisprudence

2019]

PATENT ELIGIBILITY JURISPRUDENCE

979

350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

Benson

Flook

Chakrabarty

Diehr

Figure 1. Citations to Burger Court Patent Eligibility Decisions

As can be seen, Benson, Flook, Chakrabarty, and Diehr were cited
only infrequently between 1980 and 2009, with no more than 20 citations
for any half-decade for these cases. But as the Supreme Court returned to
the issue of patent eligibility starting with Bilski, these cases took on
renewed importance. From 2010 to 2014, Benson was cited 117 times,
Flook was cited 88 times, Chakrabarty was cited 119 times, and Diehr
was cited 110 times. From 2015 through 2019, court citations to these
cases again markedly increased, as Benson was cited 264 times, Flook was
cited 205 times, Chakrabarty was cited 191 times, and Diehr was cited
332 times. Thus, even as attention has focused on the impact of recent
cases like Mayo and Alice, the Burger Court patent eligibility decisions
continue to have significance.
V. IMPLICATIONS
In this final section, we offer some implications based upon this
Article’s deep dive into the history of patentable subject matter
jurisprudence.
First, the internal deliberations of the Court in Diehr (and its
companion case, Bradley) help shed light on the ongoing debate about
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whether Flook and Diehr can be reconciled. 460 The evidence from the
Powell Archive suggests they cannot, and that Diehr should be viewed as
superseding Flook. 461 Justice Powell—who provided the critical fifth vote
in Diehr—ultimately came to view his vote in Flook as a mistake. 462 In
particular, Justice Powell concluded that language in Flook suggesting
that novelty and nonobviousness under §§ 102 and 103 were relevant in
determining patent eligibility under § 101 was erroneous. 463 This has
continuing importance today, as the Mayo decision expressly cited Flook
in declaring that “well understood, routine, conventional activity engaged
by scientists who work in the field” was insufficient “to transform an
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a
law.” 464 This reasoning is directly contradicted by Diehr, which held that
“[t]he ‘novelty’ of any elements or steps in a process, or even of the
process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter
of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject
matter.” 465 Similarly, Justice Powell expressed the view in Diehr that
“[c]laims embracing [a] process must be viewed as a whole,”466 refuting
language in Flook that seemingly parsed the claims into an unpatentable
algorithm and a series of well-known, prior art steps, then declared the
entire patent invalid. 467
The Burger Court also warned about the ramifications of a broad
reading of the judicially-created exceptions to patent eligibility, noting
that such an approach, “if carried to its extreme, [would] make all
inventions unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to
460. See Chao, supra note 424, at 430 (“[T]he Court’s failure [in Mayo] to acknowledge that
Flook and Diehr are simply irreconcilable.”); Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU
L. REV. 317, 349 (2007) (“Flook and Diehr are difficult to reconcile.”); Golden, supra note 2, at 1781
(noting “the clear tensions . . . between the differing language and holdings of Diehr and its
predecessor Flook”). But see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 n.14 (1981) (“Our reasoning in
Flook is in no way inconsistent with our reasoning here.”).
461. Cf. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 927 F.3d 1333, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (Chen, J., concurring with denial of petition for en banc rehearing) (“Given Diehr’s evident
disagreement with Flook’s analysis, Diehr, as the later opinion, was widely understood to be the
guiding, settled precedent on § 101 for over three decades.”).
462. See authorities cited supra notes 317–19 and accompanying text.
463. See authorities cited supra notes 317–19 and accompanying text; see also supra text
accompanying note 378 (expressing the view in Bradley that patent eligibility and
novelty/nonobviousness are separate issues).
464. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79 (2012) (citing Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)).
465. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981); see also Taylor, supra note 61, at 181
(also noting the apparent conflict between Diehr and Mayo).
466. First Draft, Opinion for the Court, Diamond v. Diehr (No. 79-1112), supra note 324, at 1
(handwritten note of Justice Powell).
467. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
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underlying principles of nature which, once known, make their
implementation obvious.” 468 The Roberts Court expressed a similar view
in Mayo, declaring that “too broad an interpretation of” judicially-created
exceptions to patent eligibility “could eviscerate patent law” because “all
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” 469 Despite these concerns,
§ 101 has been applied to strike down hundreds of issued patent claims in
court, 470 and to reject many more at the USPTO, particularly for computer
software and medical diagnostics. 471 Patent eligibility issues have even
reached into formerly “safe” areas like mechanical engineering. In a
recent decision, a divided Federal Circuit panel struck down a method of
manufacturing propeller shafts because the claimed method applied
Hooke’s law to help dampen vibrations, 472 despite a sharp dissent by
Judge Moore that “[t]he majority’s decision expands § 101 well beyond
its statutory gate-keeping function.” 473
In addition, the archival material recounted in this paper illustrates
the Burger Court’s struggle to understand complex and highly technical
matters like computer software and biotechnology and to reconcile these
emerging technologies with a patent law framework originally designed
for other industries. A reoccurring sentiment from the clerks and Justices
involved in these cases was that Congress should act to provide patent
applicants and the USPTO with clearer guidance about the scope of patent
eligibility for these new technologies. But as Congress had failed to do so,
it fell to the Court to address these issues. As a result, several of the
Justices cast their votes tentatively in the decision-making process
(sometimes subsequently switching sides) and tried to limit the impact of
their holdings. The Court’s difficulty in grasping the complexities of
cutting-edge technologies that are often at issue in patent eligibility

468. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189 n.12.
469. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012).
470. See Sachs, supra note 11 (“In the past five years [2014–2019], 781 unique patent claims
have been held invalid in whole or in part by federal courts.”).
471. See Colleen Chien & Jiun Ying Wu, Decoding Patentable Subject Matter, 2018
PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 1, 17 (2018) (analyzing bulk data on USPTO decisions from 2008–2017 and
finding that “the data confirm that [§] 101 is playing an increasingly important role in the examination
of software and medical diagnostic patents”).
472. Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 939 F.3d 1355, 1359–68 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
“Hooke’s law is a natural law that mathematically relates the mass and/or stiffness of an object to the
frequency with which that object oscillates (vibrates).” Id. at 1362.
473. Id. at 1368 (Moore, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1375 (“Section 101 simply should not be
this sweeping and this manipulatable. It should not be used to invalidate claims under standards
identical to those clearly articulated in other statutory sections, but not argued by the parties.”).
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disputes is echoed by Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Myriad, which
candidly raises a similar concern. 474
Ultimately, the failure of two different Courts—the Burger Court and
now the Roberts Court—to articulate clear boundaries and rules regarding
the scope of patent eligibility suggests legislative action by Congress is
desirable. Members of Congress, intellectual property scholars, and
private organizations have offered a variety of different proposals to
amend § 101 to bring greater clarity and certainty to this issue. 475
One option is to eliminate the judicially-created exceptions to patent
eligibility entirely, and instead rely on the statutory categories listed in
§ 101—process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—and a
rigorous enforcement of the remaining requirements for patentability,
including novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure of the
invention. 476 The principal benefit of this approach would be eliminating
the ongoing confusion and uncertainty created by the Mayo/Alice two-step
test, which has been widely criticized as unclear, unpredictable, and
unworkable. 477 However, this would be a drastic change, as it would
effectively overturn over 150 years of deeply-rooted tradition regarding
the common-law role of courts in determining the scope of patent
eligibility. In addition, it may undermine the view that basic knowledge
and fundamental scientific principles should be “part of the storehouse of
knowledge . . . free to all . . . and reserved exclusively to none.” 478
474. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596 (2013)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (declining to join parts of the Court’s
opinion “going into fine details of molecular biology” because he was “unable to affirm those details
on my knowledge or even my own belief”).
475. See USPTO, PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER: REPORT ON VIEWS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PUBLIC (July 2017); Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins,
Johnson, and Stivers Release Section 101 Patent Reform Framework, THOM TILLIS (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/4/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johnson-and-stiversrelease-section-101-patent-reform-framework [https://perma.cc/CQD4-VLC9]; Taylor, supra note
18; see also authorities cited supra note 17. For a helpful summary of these proposals, see Lefstin,
supra note 18, at 563–66.
476. See Lefstin, supra note 18, at 565 (“Another proposal is to eliminate the doctrine of patent
eligibility as a separate patentability requirement in favor of the other existing statutory patentability
requirements . . . .”); Risch, supra note 413, at 606–07 (“Attention to rigorous application of the
patentability standards would replace unclear and undefined subject matter rules based on
unsupportable statutory interpretations of the Patent Act.”); Taylor, supra note 18, at 2209 (“[T]o
correct the problems with the modern patent eligibility requirement, Congress might eliminate any
eligibility requirement in § 101 in favor of the patentability and specification requirements included
in the remainder of the patent statute.”).
477. See, e.g., USPTO, supra note 475, at 29–31; Mossoff, supra note 18, at 2; Osenga, supra
note 18, at 1195–97; Taylor, supra note 18, at 2154–57; Taylor, supra note 61, at 158–62.
478. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
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A second option is replace the existing judicially-created exceptions
to patent eligibility with a list of specific exclusions defined by statute. 479
This alternative, which David Taylor has called the “laundry list”
approach, 480 could be based on the framework adopted by the European
Patent Convention, which sets forth a list of ineligible patent subject
matter:
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;
(b) aesthetic creations;
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing
games or doing business, and programs for computers; [and]
(d) presentations of information. 481
The EPC further clarifies that these exceptions “shall exclude the
patentability of the subject-matter or activities referred to therein only to
the extent to which a . . . patent application . . . relates to such subjectmatter or activities as such.” 482 As a result, “claims directed only to
scientific theories are ineligible,” while “practical applications of
scientific theories would be eligible.” 483 The USPTO has also recently
adopted regulations that move a bit closer toward this approach by
delineating certain grouping of patent subject matter as presumptively
ineligible, including “mathematical concepts”; “certain methods of
organizing human activity” such as “fundamental economic principles or
practices” and “managing personal behavior or relationships or
interactions between people”; and “mental process . . . performed in the
human mind.” 484 The main benefit of this approach is that it will
(hopefully) bring greater clarity and certainty regarding the scope of
patent eligibility. The potential downsides are that it lacks flexibility
because all exceptions must be enacted—and in the future, amended—by
Congress, 485 and that it may render ineligible some categories of subject
matter that are currently patentable.486
479. Lefstin, supra note 18, at 564; Taylor, supra note 18, at 2198–2201.
480. Taylor, supra note 18, at 2198.
481. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) art. 52(2),
1065 U.N.T.S. 271–72 (Oct. 5, 1973).
482. Id. art. 52(3).
483. Taylor, supra note 18, at 2199.
484. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 52 (Jan. 7,
2019).
485. See Taylor, supra note 18, at 2201 (“Where the laundry list approach does not fare well,
however, is the principle of flexibility.”).
486. See id. at 2199–2200 (noting that methods for doing business and computer programs are
categorically ineligible under the European approach but potentially eligible under U.S. law).
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A third possibility is for Congress to adopt a new, more workable
standard for patent eligibility, and then leave its implementation to the
courts. For example, some scholars have proposed codifying the
“anything under the sun made by man” language in the 1952 Patent Act’s
legislative history, which would “eliminate from eligibility anything that
is not the result of human effort.” 487 Alternatively, Congress could modify
the existing Mayo/Alice test to make eligible any “practical application”
of an abstract idea, law of nature, or physical phenomenon, assuming the
claim falls within one of the statutory categories.488 The main potential
drawback of such an approach is that if the new standard is not well
defined, it may simply shift the battle over patent eligibility from the
Mayo/Alice framework to the new, statutory language. 489
Based upon our in-depth study of the history of patent eligibility, we
think that some combination of the second and third approaches is most
likely to bring greater clarity and certainty to the thorny question of patent
eligibility. A list of clearly defined categorical exceptions to patentable
subject matter, such as purely mental activities, algorithms standing alone,
and fundamental scientific principles as such, would protect the basic
building blocks of knowledge from exclusivity. 490 Perhaps more
controversially, Congress could also eliminate the possibility of patent
protection for products existing solely in nature, such as naturallyoccurring DNA (thus codifying Mayo), as well as methods of doing
business (thus adopting the position of the four dissenting Justices in
Bilski). In addition, Congress should consider articulating and adopting a
more workable test regarding patent eligibility for all other inventions,
such as those described in the previous paragraph. Finally, Congress
should codify some of the key reasoning in Diehr, including that
considerations of novelty and nonobviousness under § 102 and § 103 are
irrelevant to patent eligibility, and that each claim must be evaluated as a

487. Id. at 2202.
488. Lefstin, supra note 18, at 564; see also Letter from Donna P. Suchy, Section Chair, Am.
Bar Ass’n, Section of Intellectual Prop. Law, to the Hon. Michelle K. Lee, Under Sec’y of Commerce
for Intellectual Prop. & Dir. of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://patentdocs.typepad.com/ files/letter-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/HTT8-35CW] (proposing a
similar approach).
489. See The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part I: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop., S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 4, 2019) (statement of Professor
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law, at 21–22) (contending that
new statutory language regarding patent eligibility “is unlikely to generate greater certainty than
current eligibility doctrine when adjudicators subsequently interpret and apply the new legislative
language”).
490. See TILLIS, supra note 475 (proposing similar exceptions).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss4/4

70

Seaman and Wang: Patent Eligibility Jurisprudence

2019]

PATENT ELIGIBILITY JURISPRUDENCE

985

whole to determine whether it is eligible. 491 While not perfect, such an
approach would help reduce the confusion and lack of clarity endemic to
the current Mayo/Alice framework.
VI. CONCLUSION
The archival materials examined in this Article regarding the Burger
Court’s patent eligibility jurisprudence offer several important insights
regarding the scope of patentable subject matter. In particular, they reveal
that Justice Powell, whose vote was critical in Diehr, ultimately came to
view his decision against patent eligibility in Flook to be a mistake,
suggesting that the Court implicitly superseded that decision. In addition,
they candidly reveal the Court’s struggles with understanding the
intricacies of emerging, cutting-edge technology and then applying, and
in some cases modifying, the law to address them. Finally, the failure of
two different Courts, with almost thirty years in between, to clearly
delineate the scope of patent eligibility suggest that Congress may be best
suited to finally resolving this issue and providing greater clarity and
certainty to inventors, the USPTO, and the courts.

491. See id. (proposing to amend the Patent Act to “[m]ake clear that eligibility is determined
by considering each and every element of the claim as a whole and without regard to considerations
properly addressed by 102, 103 and 112”).
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